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Introduction
As the title shows, this thesis is about competition economics. The thread of
this thesis is the analysis of circumstances where unfettered competition does not
drive efficient outcomes and there is potentially scope for public intervention. The
following three chapters consider situations that require a decreasing degree of
public intervention. The first chapter explores the antitrust scrutiny of mergers in
markets that need regulatory supervision. The second chapter considers mergers in
a competitive environment. The third chapter examines a situation where market
frictions induce a distortion from the purely competitive outcome but do not justify
any public intervention.
Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Raffaele Fiocco (Fiocco and Guo 2014).
We investigate the optimal merger policy involving regulated firms. Recent decades
have witnessed merger waves in industries in large part under regulatory control,
such electricity, gas, sanitation, telecommunications, transportation and water.
We consider a merger between two regulated firms operating in two separate mar-
kets, and in each market a regulated firm interacts with unregulated competitors.
Efficiency gains are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes pri-
vate information of the merged firms. In line with existing literature, the merger
entails a trade-off between the benefits of potential efficiency gains from joint pro-
duction and the costs of distortions in the regulatory policy. Under a consumer
surplus standard, we show that, as a result of this trade-off, the optimal merger
policy depends on the intensity of competition between unregulated firms. In
particular, fiercer competition between unregulated firms induces a more lenient
merger policy. This is because fiercer competition entails a more efficient response
of unregulated firms to changes in their demand driven by distortions in the reg-
ulatory policy due to informational problems. These results can be reversed if
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the regulated firms expand into a competitive segment of the market. In par-
ticular, when the regulated and unregulated goods are complements, the merged
firm’s internalization of competitive profits arising from weaker competition (such
as Cournot instead of Bertrand competition) alleviates the regulator’s incentive
problem and relaxes the merger policy.
In Chapter 2, I study the optimal merger policy between two competitive firms.
Since Williamson (1968), it is well-established in the economic literature that a
welfare trade-off arises between market power and efficiency gains generated by a
merger. In the recent 20 years, a structural remedy, which aims at creating the
conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for the strengthen-
ing of existing competitors via divestiture, has being treated as the most effective
manner to restore effective competition. Among the structural remedies, there is
one relevant type, namely, the divestiture of differentiated brands to other com-
petitor(s). I focus on this particular remedy in a Cournot oligopolistic market
and show that it is a powerful tool to lessen the merged entity’s market power.
Divestiture can increase the scope for privately and socially desirable mergers. In
particular, I show that when goods are closer to perfect substitutability, then the
merging firms are more inclined to give some brands to competitor(s), because the
markup on each brand is lower. Therefore the range of the efficiency gains which
allows the merger with remedies to be approved is larger.
Chapter 3 is based on joint work with Fabio Antoniou and Raffaele Fiocco
(Antoniou, Fiocco and Guo 2015). We investigate the well-established observation
that retail prices adjust faster when input costs rise than when they fall. This
phenomenon, also known as “rockets and feathers” is common in many industries,
such as gasoline, coffee, corn and banking. Differently from the existing literature,
which has focused either on the consumer side or on collusion, we provide an ex-
planation from the supply side to asymmetric price adjustments, using a model of
two-period dynamic price competition. We show that the presence of profitable
storing allows competitive firms to credibly commit to immediately increase their
prices above current marginal costs when they anticipate higher input costs. This
relaxes competition and firms earn positive profits. If input costs are expected to
decline, the firms are trapped in the Bertrand paradox and price adjustment is
slower. Storing drives asymmetric pricing even under alternative markets struc-
2
tures, such as monopoly or Cournot competition.
3
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Chapter 1
Mergers between regulated firms
with unknown efficiency gains
This chapter is based on Fiocco and Guo (2014).
1.1 Introduction
The adequate antitrust scrutiny of mergers between firms is a relevant policy is-
sue in modern countries. The US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG), revised
by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission in 2010, and
the EC Merger Regulation reformed in 2004 have acknowledged the relevance of
cost synergies in merger control. Two major practical problems recognized by
antitrust authorities and courts concern the uncertainty about the magnitude of
efficiency gains before the merger and the merging firms’ privileged information
about the realization of efficiency gains. Antitrust authorities emphasize the issue
of uncertainty, since “efficiencies projected reasonably and in good faith by the
merging firms may not be realized” (HMG, Sect. 4).1 Moreover, as declared by
Judge T. F. Hogan for the 1997 merger case of Staples and Office Depot, “the
Court agrees with the defendants that where, as here, the merger has not yet been
consummated, it is impossible to quantify precisely the efficiencies that it is will
1Document available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html.
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generate” (US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civ. No. 97-701).2
After the merger materializes, the merged firm can privately learn the realiza-
tion of efficiency gains. In fact, “efficiencies are difficult to verify and quantify,
in part because much of the information relating to efficiencies is uniquely in the
possession of the merging firms” (HMG, Sect. 4). As Amir et al. (2009, p. 266)
point out, “this first-to-know advantage thus emerges as a natural candidate for
the fundamental asymmetry that mergers seem to trigger in favor of the merged
firm”.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the welfare effects of a merger between
regulated firms when efficiency gains from joint production are uncertain before
the merger and their realization becomes private information of the merged entity.
Despite the importance of this phenomenon, mergers in regulated industries
have received so far little theoretical attention. Recent decades have witnessed
merger waves in industries in large part under regulatory control, such as elec-
tricity, gas, sanitation, telecommunications, transportation and water. Since en-
terprises with large numbers of customers and considerable assets are usually in-
volved, the economic relevance of the consolidation process in regulated industries
is definitively high. The 2014 report of Ernst & Young on worldwide mergers
and acquisitions of regulated utilities underlines that “strong momentum behind
merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in the global power and utilities (P&U)
sector continued, driving deal value to US$38.6b — the highest third-quarter deal
value since Q3 2010”. The empirical literature has investigated the impact of
mergers in utility sectors on operating costs and shareholder wealth creation (e.g.,
see Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) and Datta et al. (2013) and the references cited
therein).
Notable examples of mergers in regulated industries abound. E.ON, one of
the world’s largest energy utility providers, was created in 2000 as a result of
the merger between Veba (traditionally established in northern Germany) and
Viag (traditionally established in southern Germany), with a deal value of about
14 billion dollars. In 2012 Duke Energy, operating in Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio
2This conclusion is also supported by empirical evidence and stylized facts. Motta (2004, Ch.
5, p. 242) states that “merging parties often have a genuine tendency to overstate the benefits
from combining their activities and assets. Even strictly internal and confidential documents
often report too optimistic an assessment of the merger’s efficiency gains”.
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and Western Carolinas, merged with Progress Energy, operating in Florida and
Eastern Carolinas. This merger was realized through a transaction of about 32
billion dollars and generated the largest energy utility in the US by number of
customers. On November 20, 2014 the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) approved the merger between Exelon, which distributes electricity to
approximately 6.6 million customers in Illinois, Pennsylvania and Maryland, and
Pepco, which serves the District of Columbia and the surrounding communities.3
The Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs), which provide regulated local
telephone services in distinct areas of the US as a result of the 1984 divestiture of
AT&T, have engaged after the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
in merger operations that have reduced their number from seven to only three.4
The consolidation process in regulated industries is also pervasive outside the
US. The number of electric utilities in Ontario fell from over 300 in the 1990s to
74 in 2011 as a result of merger activities (Kushner and Ogwang 2014). Accord-
ing to the latest available (2007) report of the European Commission on mergers
and acquisitions, 1002 mergers occurred in 2006 in European regulated network
industries, which represent 11.6% of all merger deals. Mergers between regulated
utilities seem to be particularly popular in Italy. A2A S.p.A., the third largest Ital-
ian electricity company, was created in 2008 from the merger between AEM Milan
and ASM Brescia, operating in two different areas of Lombardy. In 2012 Hera,
the third largest Italian gas company based in Bologna, merged with AcegasAps
Group, which serves Padua and Trieste.5
The empirical evidence and the stylized facts discussed so far indicate that a
natural feature of mergers in regulated industries is that they involve firms op-
erating in distinct territories. Kwoka and Pollitt (2010) emphasize this aspect in
their analysis of the consolidation process in the US electricity sector, where more
than 75 mergers occurred between 1994 and 2003, involving half of the customers
of all investor-owned electricity companies, with a total deal value of over 300
billion dollars. To illustrate the nature of this consolidation process, Kwoka and
3Details on the most significant mergers between regulated utilities filed by the FERC can be
found at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/gen-info/mergers.asp.
4Cox and Portes (1998) provide some relevant case studies of mergers in regulated industries.
5We refer to Grossi et al. (2010) for a discussion of the institutional trends in local public
utilities in Europe.
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Pollitt (2010, p. 647) refer to the merger realized in 1999 between Boston Edison,
the major utility serving Boston, and Commonwealth Energy System, which op-
erates in neighboring Cambridge (through its subsidiary Cambridge Electric) and
in southern Massachusetts.
Over the last decades most regulated industries have been involved in a partial
liberalization process that has increased the scope for demand interconnections
between regulated and unregulated firms. In the energy sector, transmission and
distribution networks are typically regulated, while retail services are often open to
competition. Regulated local telephone services coexist with unregulated telecom-
munications services, such as broadband Internet, long-distance and digital cable
telephone services. Regulated railways operate in competition with unregulated
long-distance buses and airlines. In big cities, regulated public utilities run rail-
ways, subways and buses, while unregulated firms supply alternative services such
as car sharing or car rental. As Aubert and Pouyet (2006) emphasize, a major
characteristic of current regulatory structures is that regulated and unregulated
firms interact by providing differentiated products.
In this chapter we characterize the optimal merger policy involving regulated
firms, whose task is to find a balance between the benefits of potential efficiency
gains from the merger and the costs of distortions in the regulatory policy due to
the aforementioned informational problems about efficiency gains. We explore this
trade-off in a setting where a merger occurs between two regulated firms operating
in two separate markets. The previous discussion indicates that mergers in regu-
lated industries typically involve firms that provide the same service but operate
in different regions, since they constitute local natural monopolies. This is the
case of energy networks, local telephone services and local public transportation.
In each market a regulated firm interacts with unregulated competitors because
they provide goods that exhibit either some degree of substitutability (e.g., regu-
lated railways and unregulated buses) or complementarity (e.g., regulated energy
networks and unregulated retail services). Our purpose is to investigate the impact
of the intensity of competition in the unregulated part of the market on the optimal
merger policy involving regulated firms. For the sake of concreteness, we consider
two standard modes of competition. Unregulated firms compete either fiercely in
Bertrand fashion (as in a classical competitive fringe model), which entails zero
8
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market power, or in Cournot fashion, which is less intense and leads to higher
profits. The main difference between these two modes of competition lies in the
degree of toughness of product market competition or “toughness of price compe-
tition” (Sutton 1991).6 Since competition is typically tougher (namely, the firms’
market power and associated profits decline) as the number of firms increases, our
qualitative results carry over if we consider the impact of the number of firms in
the unregulated part of the market on the optimal merger policy in any standard
setting of (imperfect) competition.
We find that, in the presence of uncertainty over post-merger costs before the
merger occurs, Bertrand competition leads to a more lenient merger challenge
rule than Cournot competition. To understand the rationale for this result, it is
important to realize that, when post-merger costs are uncertain, an ex ante welfare-
enhancing merger may eventually result in higher costs, namely, efficiency losses,
driven for instance by clashes between corporate cultures (e.g., White 1987).7 In
this case, even when post-merger costs become common knowledge, the regulated
production decreases because regulated activities are more inefficient. As Bertrand
competition is more intense than Cournot competition, Bertrand competitors re-
act more aggressively to changes in their demand stemming from regulated output
reductions. Hence, more intense competition relaxes the condition for allowing
the merger. Private information of the merged firm about the realization of post-
merger cost synergies strengthens this result. As it is well established in the
optimal regulation literature (e.g., Baron and Myerson 1982), a regulator prefers
to tolerate some allocative inefficiency from the downward output distortion for
the inefficient firm in order to limit the (socially costly) informational rents appro-
priated by the efficient firm. The more prompt reaction of Bertrand competitors
to reductions in the regulated output with respect to Cournot competitors allevi-
ates the allocative costs of downward regulated output distortions and softens the
6It is fairly common in the literature on industrial organization and regulation to compare
Bertrand and Cournot competition when investigating the welfare effects of the nature of com-
petition in different industry structures. We refer to Calzolari and Scarpa (2014) for such a
comparison in a model where, as in our setting, efficiency gains generated by a merger are
private information of the merging firms. Mandy and Sappington (2007) and Chen and Sapping-
ton (2010) are further prominent examples of investigations based on the comparison between
Bertrand and Cournot competition. In Section 1.3 we provide additional discussion on this point.
7In Section 1.3 we discuss the possibility of efficiency losses.
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regulator’s incentive problem.
In the second part of the chapter, we show that these predictable results can
be reversed if regulated firms diversify into a competitive segment of the market.
In the energy, telecommunications and transportation sectors, regulated utilities
often have affiliates in the liberalized part of the market where they operate. While
the intensity of Bertrand competition tends to erode the firms’ profits and therefore
makes the regulated firms’ diversification into the unregulated segment inconse-
quential, things are different under Cournot competition. In particular, when the
regulated and unregulated goods are complements, competitive profits can disci-
pline the diversified merged firm’s strategic behavior. The efficient merged firm has
a weaker incentive to claim to be inefficient since a lower regulated quantity due
to cost misrepresentation reduces the demand and the profits in the unregulated
segment. The regulated firm’s internalization of competitive profits alleviates the
regulator’s incentive problem and relaxes merger policy. In this case, the regulated
firm’s diversification into a competitive segment implies that softer competition
leads to a more lenient merger challenge rule.
To the best of our knowledge, this chapter constitutes the first attempt to
shed some light on the welfare effects of informational problems about efficiency
gains due to mergers between regulated firms. Our analysis recommends a serious
assessment of the intensity of competition in markets where merging regulated
firms interact with unregulated competitors. It also provides theoretical support
for the view of practitioners and policy makers that the effects of mergers be-
tween regulated firms on regulatory policies deserve adequate investigation. For
instance, as emphasized in the Order issued on February 16, 2012, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) considers the impact on rates and reg-
ulation as a crucial factor when evaluating a proposed merger between regulated
utilities.8 Despite the stylized formulation for expositional purposes, the principles
underlying our results are fairly general. Our analysis may therefore stimulate the
theoretical and practical debate on antitrust and regulatory policies.
8Document available at http://ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2012/021612/E-2.pdf.
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1.2 Related literature
The emphasis on efficiency gains in merger reviews in unregulated markets traces
back to the seminal paper of Williamson (1968) that investigates the welfare trade-
off between market power and efficiency gains generated by a merger. Our work is
related to two main strands of the merger literature. The first strand explores the
role of pre-merger uncertainty and post-merger private information about efficiency
gains. Chone´ and Linnemer (2008) examine the welfare effects of uncertainty ac-
cording to the curvature of the social objective function but ignore the presence of
asymmetric information after the merger. Closer to our work is the paper of Amir
et al. (2009) that analyzes the merger performance when efficiency gains are un-
certain before the merger and the merging firms privately observe their realization
after the merger. The authors show that a bilateral merger is profitable if non-
merging firms believe with a sufficiently high probability that the merger will en-
gender large efficiency gains, even though none actually realize. Along these lines,
Hamada (2012) demonstrates that, as the variance of uncertainty about synergies
grows, mergers generate larger expected profits and improve expected consumer
surplus. Calzolari and Scarpa (2014) explore the welfare effects of allowing a firm
established in regulated and competitive markets to combine its assets, which cre-
ates privately known economies of scope. Contrary to these works, we examine
mergers between regulated firms.
The second strand of literature that is relevant for our purposes investigates
the optimal institutional design of regulated industries. We refer to Armstrong
and Sappington (2007) for a review on optimal regulation. In a setting with com-
plementary products and private cost information, Baron and Besanko (1992) and
Gilbert and Riordan (1995) show that allowing a single firm to integrate production
improves social welfare through a reduction in informational rents. Iossa (1999)
finds that (dis)integrated production tends to be preferred with substitutes (com-
plements) when asymmetric information concerns consumer demand. Contrary to
these contributions which ignore technological economies of scope and assume that
markets are entirely regulated, we explore the role of uncertainty and asymmetric
information about efficiency gains in an industry where regulated and unregulated
firms interact.
11
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The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.3 sets out the formal
model. Section 1.4 considers the benchmark case of full information. Section
1.5 characterizes the optimal merger policy under uncertainty and asymmetric
information about post-merger costs. Section 1.6 derives the optimal merger policy
when regulated firms diversify into a competitive segment of the market. Section
1.7 discusses some assumptions of the model. Section 1.8 concludes and provides
some policy implications. All formal proofs are collected in the Appendix.
1.3 The model
Setting We wish to investigate the welfare implications of a merger between two
regulated firms that operate in two separate markets, for instance two different
regions of a country. In each market a regulated firm interacts with unregulated
competitors since they provide differentiated goods.
Following Aubert and Pouyet (2006), gross consumer surplus in each market
i = 1, 2 is specified by a utility function a` la Singh and Vives (1984) of the form
Ui = αqir + αqiu − 1
2
(q2ir + q
2
iu + 2γqirqiu), (1.1)
where qir and qiu respectively denote the quantity of the regulated good and the
quantity of the unregulated good in market i. Consumer surplus in (1.1) yields a
system of linear inverse demand functions in market i given by
pir = α− qir − γqiu
piu = α− qiu − γqir,
where α > 0 is the demand intercept and γ ∈ (−1, 1) captures the degree of
product differentiation between the regulated good and the unregulated good.9 If
γ > (<)0, goods are substitutes (complements). As discussed in Section 1.1, reg-
ulated railways and unregulated buses exhibit some degree of substitutability, as
well as regulated local telephone and unregulated Internet services. In the energy
sector, regulated networks and unregulated retail services are classical examples
9Without loss of generality, the slope of the demand function is normalized to 1. The standard
assumption |γ| < 1 guarantees that own-price effects are larger than cross-price effects.
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of complementary goods. To make our analysis more transparent, and without
affecting our qualitative results, we assume that the two markets are symmetric.
This reflects the idea that mergers in regulated industries usually involve local nat-
ural monopolies which provide the same service (e.g., energy, telecommunications,
transportation) but operate in different regions and face a similar competitive
segment in each region.10
In the absence of a merger, one regulated firm is established in each market.
The profit of regulated firm i = 1, 2 is
piir = Tir − cqir, (1.2)
where Tir is a transfer payment to the firm via the regulatory process and c is the
(constant) marginal cost of production.11 As discussed further below, a regulatory
contract specifies a quantity to be produced and a transfer to the firm, while
no price is charged for the regulated good. Therefore, our analysis identifies a
classical procurement problem, where the regulated firm receives a transfer for the
quantity produced. As it is well established in the optimal regulation literature, the
regulatory outcome associated with this transfer can be replicated with a two-part
tariff that consists of a unit price and a fixed fee.
If the two regulated firms merge, a single regulated entity operates in the two
markets. The profit of the merged regulated firm is
pir = Tr − C(q1r, q2r; θ), (1.3)
where Tr is a transfer payment to the firm and C(q1r, q2r; θ) = cq1r + cq2r− θq1rq2r
represents the total cost of production after the merger. This cost function captures
in a simple and natural manner the presence of interdependent costs.12 If θ =
− ∂2C
∂qir∂qjr
> (<)0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, joint production generates efficiency gains
(losses), or (dis)economies of scope, since a larger output of one product reduces
(increases) the marginal cost of the other product.
10In line with the main literature, we abstract from an analysis of the optimal degree of
(de)regulation.
11Nothing substantial would change with non-linear, different marginal costs.
12See, e.g., Motta (2004, Ch. 8) and Calzolari and Scarpa (2009, 2014) for the use of this cost
specification.
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Following Farrell and Shapiro (2001, pp. 692-693), efficiency gains are inter-
preted as merger-specific synergies obtained through the “intimate integration of
the parties’ unique, hard-to-trade assets”.13 Before the merger, the magnitude
of cost synergies is uncertain. It is common knowledge that with probability
ν ∈ (0, 1) the merger entails efficiency gains θh > 0. In line with the main lit-
erature about uncertain efficiency gains (e.g., Amir et al. 2009), this probability
can be thought of as the common belief about the merged firm’s ability to achieve
the posited efficiency gains, given the information available about the case and
possibly all previously treated similar cases. After the merger, the merged firm
privately learns the realization of cost synergies. With complementary probability
1 − ν, the merger results in efficiency losses θl < 0, where ∆θ ≡ θh − θl > 0.
Integrating production may entail higher costs caused, for instance, by clashes be-
tween corporate cultures and difficulties in melding two different managerial and
production systems. In the largest cross-national study on mergers over the pe-
riod 1981-1998, Gugler et al. (2003) conclude that only 29% of all mergers created
efficiency gains. In regulated industries such as electricity, railways and water, em-
pirical investigations show that mergers may entail efficiency losses (e.g., Bitzan
and Wilson 2007; Kwoka and Pollitt 2010; Torres and Morrison Paul 2006). In
the theoretical literature, efficiency losses after a merger are explicitly modelled in
some recent contributions (e.g., Chone´ and Linnemer 2008; Hamada 2012).
Cost synergies constitute the unique parameter of private information in our
model. This allows us to focus on the informational effects of the merger and
makes our analysis more transparent. Remarkably, this formulation is consistent
with the common idea that a regulator can (at least to some extent) extract the
private information of monopolists established in different regions by implementing
yardstick competition. After the merger, this becomes clearly more difficult and
the new entity is in a better position to manipulate its costs. Further discussion
in support of our framework is provided in Section 1.7.1.
In the unregulated segment of each market, two firms s = 1, 2 provide a homo-
geneous good and obtain profits piis = pisqis − cqis, where pis is the price for the
13We ignore savings on fixed costs which follow from a reduction in administrative and person-
nel costs after the merger, since they do not affect our qualitative results. These synergies are
viewed with skepticism by antitrust authorities, because they typically stem from a mere output
reorganization that could be achieved without the merger (e.g., Motta 2004, Ch. 5).
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good provided by firm s in market i (pis = piu in equilibrium) and qis is the cor-
responding output, with
∑2
s=1 qis ≡ qiu.14 Since efficiency gains from the merger
must be merger-specific, they do not affect the costs in the competitive segment.
The unregulated firms engage either in Bertrand (price) competition or in Cournot
(quantity) competition. As discussed in the introduction, the difference between
these two standard modes of competition captures in a simple and tractable man-
ner the intensity or toughness of product market competition.15 Specifically, the
equilibrium of a two-stage game where firms choose capacities and then prices
coincides with the Cournot equilibrium, in which quantities are to be interpreted
as capacities (Davidson and Deneckere 1983). Cournot competition is less intense
than Bertrand competition and typically characterizes those markets where firms
have the opportunity to choose investment levels (capacities) that soften price
competition (Tirole 1988, Ch. 5).
Using (1.1), the aggregate net consumer surplus in the two markets is given by
CS = U1 + U2 − (T1r + T2r)−
∑2
s=1
p1sq1s −
∑2
s=1
p2sq2s, (1.4)
with T1r + T2r being replaced by Tr in case of merger. A regulator is charged
with maximizing welfare in (1.4) when designing the regulatory policy.16 In the
absence of the merger, the regulator offers a contract Tir, qir to regulated firm
i = 1, 2. If the merger occurs, the contract offered to the merged regulated entity
is Tr, q1r, q2r. It is worth noting that the regulatory contract specifies a pair of
transfer and quantity for each good, irrespective of the mode of competition in
the unregulated segment. Using standard techniques, our results carry over if we
consider the regulation of prices instead of quantities.
The welfare standard in (1.4) is also relevant to merger policy. This reflects the
14Our qualitative results carry over with product differentiation (and possibly different costs)
even within the competitive segment of each market. Our analysis can also be generalized to the
case of more than two firms.
15In Section 1.8 we provide practical examples where Bertrand or Cournot competition may
tend to prevail.
16Without loss of generality, we neglect the social cost of collecting funds through distortionary
taxation to finance regulated production (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1986). This increases unnec-
essarily further the cost of transfers in the welfare function and does not affect our qualitative
conclusions (Armstrong and Sappington 2007). In the same vein, our qualitative results go
through if we allow for a weight (smaller than 1) attached to profits in the welfare standard in
(1.4).
15
CHAPTER 1
common perception that, at least in Europe and in the US, antitrust authorities
focus on consumer surplus in merger investigations (e.g., Motta 2004, Ch. 1).17
Timing The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
(I) The regulator decides whether to allow the merger between the regulated firms
or not.
(II) If the merger is not allowed, the regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer
of a regulatory policy to each regulated firm, which can either accept or reject
the offer (the reservation utility is normalized to zero). If merger is allowed, the
merger takes place and the merged entity privately learns the realization of its cost
type θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Afterwards, the regulator makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a
regulatory policy to the merged entity, which can either accept or reject the offer.
(III) If the regulatory offer(s) is (are) accepted, regulation is implemented.
(IV) Competition in the unregulated segment takes place.
In summary, after deciding on the merger, the regulator determines the reg-
ulatory policy and then competition occurs. We solve this game by backward
induction.
Some remarks are in order at this point. We do not distinguish between the
antitrust authority and the regulatory agency, since in practice they usually have
concurrent jurisdiction over merger reviews in regulated industries and cooperate
in reaching a final decision.18 Moreover, we consider a single regulator charged
with controlling both markets. However, different regulators (one for each mar-
ket) are sometimes established, and miscoordination problems might occur after
the merger. While in our setting no externality arises on the demand side since
consumers are located in different regions, the cost function in (1.3) of the merged
firm is not separable in the two regulated outputs, and therefore assigning each
regulator the control of a part of the merged firm’s profits cannot be done un-
ambiguously. To cope with regulatory miscoordination problems, in practice a
regulator with a large jurisdiction is usually involved, such as the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) for mergers and acquisitions of energy utilities
17Theoretical foundations can be found in Neven and Ro¨ller (2005).
18Miscoordination between the antitrust authority and the regulator would introduce addi-
tional issues that are outside the scope of our analysis.
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in the US. Alternatively, active cooperation is promoted between different regula-
tors. Since we aim at investigating the welfare effects of informational problems
associated with efficiency gains, we abstract from additional issues arising from
potential miscoordination between regulators.
In line with some relevant contributions to the merger literature (e.g., Amir et
al. 2009; Calzolari and Scarpa 2014; Chone´ and Linnemer 2008; Hamada 2012),
cost synergies are unknown before the merger. Their realization occurs after the
merger and is privately observed by the merged firm. As argued in the introduc-
tion, practitioners acknowledge that cost synergies cannot be precisely quantified
before a merger has been consummated, while the merged firm can have privileged
information about their realization after the merger. Section 1.7.1 considers the
case where the merging firms are better informed than the regulator even before
the merger.
As in standard regulatory models, the implementation of regulatory contract-
ing precedes the competition stage. This reflects the complexity of regulatory
procedures that are more difficult to alter than market decisions.
Finally, we take as exogenously given the merger decision of the regulated firms.
Section 1.7.2 is devoted to a discussion of the firms’ incentives to merge.
1.4 Full information
For illustrative purposes, we present the benchmark case in which the magnitude
of efficiency gains (losses) θ ∈ {θh, θl} is common knowledge before the merger
takes place.
Remark 1 With full information about θ ∈ {θh, θl}, the merger is welfare enhanc-
ing if and only if θ = θh, irrespective of the mode of competition in the unregulated
segment.
In the absence of informational problems about post-merger costs, the merger
desirability only depends on the magnitude of these costs. A merger should be
approved if and only if it engenders efficiency gains, and competition in the un-
regulated segment is inconsequential.
17
CHAPTER 1
1.5 Unknown efficiencies
In the sequel, we show that the natural result in Remark 1 does not holds when
post-merger costs are uncertain before the merger and their realization becomes
private information of the merged firm.
1.5.1 Uncertainty
In order to better appreciate the impact of uncertainty and asymmetric informa-
tion, we first consider the case in which cost synergies are uncertain before the
merger and become common knowledge after the merger.
The following lemma formalizes the optimal merger policy with uncertain effi-
ciency gains.
Lemma 1 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes
common knowledge after the merger. Then, under Bertrand competition in the
unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if and only if
ν > −1− γ
2 − θh
(1− γ2)∆θ θl ≡ ν
b ∈ (0, 1). (1.5)
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante wel-
fare enhancing if and only if
ν > −9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
(9− 4γ2)∆θ θl ≡ ν
c ∈ (0, 1). (1.6)
We have νc > νb, where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0.
Lemma 1 reveals the predictable result that, when the magnitude of costs
generated by the merger is uncertain, the merger should be approved only if the
probability of efficiency gains is relatively high.19 More interestingly, conditions
(1.5) and (1.6) show that in the presence of uncertainty the intensity of competition
prevailing in the unregulated segment of the market affects the optimal merger
policy. In particular, as the last part of Lemma 1 indicates, Bertrand competition
19The positivity conditions on quantities ensure νb ∈ (0, 1) and νc ∈ (0, 1). We refer to the
proof of Lemma 1 (provided in the Appendix) for technical details.
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relaxes the condition for allowing the merger. Since the regulator’s merger decision
is made under uncertainty about cost realization, an ex ante welfare-enhancing
merger may eventually result in efficiency losses, namely, higher post-merger costs,
which lead to lower regulated production. Bertrand competition is more intense
than Cournot competition, and therefore Bertrand rivals react more aggressively
to reductions in regulated production. This alleviates the welfare losses from more
inefficient post-merger regulated activities. As a result, more intense competition
in the unregulated segment of the market allows the regulator to establish a merger
challenge rule which is more lenient with the merging firms.
1.5.2 Uncertainty and asymmetric information
We now consider the case where cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and
privately observed by the merged firm after the merger. Invoking the revelation
principle (e.g., Myerson 1979), the regulator can restrict attention to a direct
incentive compatible contract menu {(Trh, q1rh, q2rh), (Trl, q1rl, q2rl)} that induces
the merged firm to truthfully reveal its cost type θ ∈ {θh, θl}. Using the merged
firm’s profit in (1.3), the following incentive compatibility constraints must be
fulfilled
pirh = Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θhq1rhq2rh
> Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θhq1rlq2rl
= pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl, (1.7)
pirl = Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θlq1rlq2rl
> Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θlq1rhq2rh
= pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh. (1.8)
Conditions (1.7) and (1.8) ensure that the merged firm does not benefit from mis-
reporting its private information. Adopting standard techniques, we find that the
incentive condition (1.7) for the efficient firm is binding at the optimal contract.20
20See the proof of Lemma 2 (provided in the Appendix) for technical details.
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After defining
φ(ν) ≡ ν
1− ν , (1.9)
we are in a position to characterize the optimal regulatory policy when the merger
is permitted.
Lemma 2 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes
private information of the merged firm after the merger. If the merger is allowed,
under Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i
are
q˜mbirh =
(1− γ)(α− c)
1− γ2 − θh , q˜
mb
irl =
(1− γ)(α− c)
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ ;
q˜mbiuh =
(1− γ − θh)(α− c)
1− γ2 − θh , q˜
mb
iul =
(1− γ − θl + ∆θφ)(α− c)
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ .
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the outputs in market i
are
q˜mcirh =
(9− 4γ)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θh , q˜
mc
irl =
(9− 4γ)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ ;
q˜mciuh =
6(1− γ − θh)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θh , q˜
mc
iul =
6(1− γ − θl + ∆θφ)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ .
Lemma 2 reveals the familiar trade-off between allocative efficiency and the
firm’s rent extraction in the presence of asymmetric information (e.g., Baron and
Myerson 1982). The production of the efficient firm coincides with that under
symmetric information (“no distortion at the top” result). However, the regulator
finds it optimal to reduce the output of the inefficient firm in order to limit the
(socially costly) informational rents in (1.7) appropriated by the efficient firm. The
quantities for the two goods of the inefficient merged firm are distorted downwards,
since asymmetric information concerns the costs of joint production.
Equipped with the results in Lemma 2, we can characterize the optimal merger
policy in the presence of uncertainty and asymmetric information.
Proposition 1 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and be-
comes private information of the merged firm after the merger. Then, under
Bertrand competition in the unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante welfare
20
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γ0
ν
νb
νc
ν˜b
ν˜c
Figure 1.1: Merger policy
enhancing if and only if
ν > − 1− γ
2 − θh
θ2h − (1− γ2)θl
θl ≡ ν˜b ∈ (νb, 1). (1.10)
Under Cournot competition in the unregulated segment, the merger is ex ante wel-
fare enhancing if and only if
ν > − 9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
9θ2h − (9− 4γ2)θl
θl ≡ ν˜c ∈ (νc, 1). (1.11)
We have ν˜c − ν˜b > νc − νb > 0, where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0.
When cost synergies are uncertain before the merger and their realization be-
comes private information of the merged firm, the merger yields a trade-off between
the benefits of potential efficiency gains and the social costs of regulatory distor-
tions. The combination of pre-merger uncertainty and post-merger asymmetric
information complicates the regulator’s informational problem. Hence, irrespec-
tive of the mode of competition, the regulator selects a merger challenge rule that
is more severe than in the case of only pre-merger uncertainty.21
Figure 1.1 illustrates the results in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. As the last
part of Proposition 1 reveals, asymmetric information strengthens the condition
21The positivity conditions on quantities ensure ν˜b ∈ (νb, 1) and ν˜c ∈ (νc, 1). We refer to the
proof of Proposition 1 (provided in the Appendix) for technical details.
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for allowing the merger under Cournot competition to a larger extent than the
condition under Bertrand competition. This corresponds to an increase in the
sensitivity of merger policy to the intensity of competition in the unregulated seg-
ment of the market. We know from Lemma 2 that the presence of asymmetric
information in addition to uncertainty aggravates the regulator’s informational
problem and this translates into a reduction in the regulated output of the inef-
ficient firm in order to reduce the informational rents to the efficient firm. The
higher intensity of Bertrand competition mitigates the associated welfare losses to
a larger extent than Cournot competition. Hence, the combination of pre-merger
uncertainty and post-merger asymmetric information induces the regulator to in-
crease the toughness of the merger challenge rule in response to softer competition
in the unregulated part of the market.
As Figure 1.1 depicts, the degree of differentiation between regulated and un-
regulated goods affects the optimal merger policy. A higher demand interdepen-
dence results in a more lenient merger policy, irrespective of the mode of compe-
tition. This is because the competitive segment can better alleviate the allocative
losses in the regulated part of market driven by informational problems. In the
light of our previous discussion, it does not come entirely as a surprise that this
effect is more pronounced under Bertrand than under Cournot competition, since
Bertrand competitors respond more efficiently to regulatory distortions. There-
fore, if we interpret the degree of substitutability as a measure of the strength
of competition between regulated and unregulated firms, we can conclude that
more intense competition both among unregulated firms and between regulated
and unregulated firms induces a softer merger challenge rule.
It is also worth investigating the impact of an exacerbation of asymmetric
information about post-merger costs on the optimal merger policy. To this aim,
we consider a mean preserving spread of the original distribution function for
θ ∈ θh, θl, by keeping the expectation over θ constant and increasing ∆θ. For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that θh and θl are equally likely, i.e., ν = 0.5, which
yields an expected value θ = 0.5θh+0.5θl. Our result is formalized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Define ∆νk ≡ ν˜k− νk, k = b, c. Then, for θ = 0.5θh + 0.5θl, it holds
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that ∂∆ν
k
∂θh
> 0, k = b, c, if θh is not too high.
A higher θh must be associated with a lower θl when the mean θ remains con-
stant. The resulting increase in ∆θ corresponds to an aggravation of the regulator’s
informational problem and leads to an increase in the toughness of merger chal-
lenge rule relative to the case of only pre-merger uncertainty, irrespective of the
mode of competition. This holds true if the magnitude of efficiency gains θh is not
too high, otherwise allowing the merger is always optimal (for a given probability
of efficiency gains).
1.6 Diversification into the unregulated segment
In practice, regulated firms can be active in a competitive part of the market
as well. Regulated utilities that provide energy transmission and distribution
often engage in competitive retail services. Regulated suppliers of basic local
telephone services may also offer long-distance telephone and broadband Internet
services at unregulated rates. In this section we investigate the implications for
the design of the optimal merger policy that arise when regulated firms expand
into a competitive segment of the market.
In line with the most common regulatory practices in Europe and in the US,
we assume that the regulated activities of a firm are legally unbundled from its
competitive activities. This entails separate accounts for regulated and competitive
operations so that provision of each commodity is stand-alone profitable and the
regulator is only allowed to control regulated activities.22 As Vickers (1995, p.
14) suggests, a realistic formulation of the participation constraint requires that,
as in the absence of diversification, a firm at least break even in its regulated
activities. Moreover, in the literature on legal unbundling (e.g., Cremer and De
Donder 2013; Ho¨ffler and Kranz 2011; Sibley and Weisman 1998), a regulated firm
is entitled to receive competitive profits but cannot interfere in the operations of
the competitive affiliate, which independently maximizes its own profits. In our
22For instance, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 provides that the US incumbent local
exchange carriers can obtain a reasonable profit from regulated activities, while earnings from
unregulated activities are not relevant to the definition of a reasonable profit (Sidak and Spulber
1998, Ch. 9).
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setting, the maximization of competitive profits follows irrespective of whether
the affiliate cares about its own profits or total profits, since regulated profits are
entirely determined by the regulatory contract.
This discussion implies that the results in the absence of a merger remain
unchanged.23 However, the regulated firms’ diversification into the unregulated
segment of the market can affect the incentives to strategically manipulate the
private information about cost synergies after the merger, because the merged firm
internalizes the impact of its behavior on the profits from competitive activities.
Since under Bertrand competition profits are competed away, the regulated
firms’ diversification is inconsequential and the results in Sections 1.4 and 1.5.1
are unaffected. However, Cournot competition entails positive profits, and we
show that the diversification into a Cournot segment leads to new results of some
interest. As in the baseline model, we consider two identical competitive firms
s = 1, 2 in each market i = 1, 2, which have profits piis(qir). Regulated firm i now
owns one competitive subsidiary (say, firm 1) in the market where it operates,
whose profits are pii1(qir).
24 Since the subsidiary maximizes its own profits, the
outcome in the competition stage is unchanged.
If the merger is allowed, the new regulated entity controls two competitive
firms, one in each market. The merged firm cares about the sum of regulated
and unregulated profits when manipulating its private information. Formally, the
incentive compatibility constraints are
23Such a conclusion deserves a remark. If goods are complements, the diversified regulated
firm is willing to accept any regulatory contract that ensures non-negative profits from regulated
activities. This is not the case under substitutability, since regulated production reduces the
demand and the profits in the unregulated segment. In order to induce the regulated firm to
accept the regulatory contract, the regulator could prohibit the regulated firm’s diversification
into the unregulated segment when it rejects a contract which guarantees non-negative regulated
profits. If this is not feasible, a further constraint should be introduced, which ensures the firm’s
participation in the regulatory relationship. It can be shown that this additional constraint does
not alter the qualitative comparison between merger challenge rules under Bertrand and Cournot
competition, and therefore our main results carry over.
24Our qualitative results carry over when only one regulated firm diversifies into the compet-
itive segment. In Section 1.8 we discuss the case in which one regulated firm expands into the
unregulated segment of the market where the other regulated firm operates.
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pirh + pi
11(q1rh) + pi
21(q2rh) = Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θhq1rhq2rh + pi11(q1rh) + pi21(q2rh)
> Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θhq1rlq2rl + pi11(q1rl) + pi21(q2rl)
= pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl + pi
11(q1rl) + pi
21(q2rl),
pirl + pi
11(q1rl) + pi
21(q2rl) = Trl − cq1rl − cq2rl + θlq1rlq2rl + pi11(q1rl) + pi21(q2rl)
> Trh − cq1rh − cq2rh + θlq1rhq2rh + pi11(q1rh) + pi21(q2rh)
= pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh + pi11(q1rh) + pi21(q2rh).
Using the profits pii1(qir) =
(α−c−γqir)2
9
of the merged firm’s subsidiary in market i
under Cournot competition, the incentive constraints can be rewritten after some
manipulation as follows
pirh > pirl + ∆θq1rlq2rl +
γ
9
∑2
i=1
(2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl)(qirh − qirl), (1.12)
pirl > pirh −∆θq1rhq2rh + γ
9
∑2
i=1
(2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl)(qirl − qirh). (1.13)
Adding (1.12) and (1.13) yields
q1rhq2rh > q1rlq2rl. (1.14)
In the following lemma we characterize the optimal regulatory policy when the
merger is permitted.
Lemma 3 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and becomes
private information of the merged firm after the merger. Moreover, suppose that
the merging firms diversify into the unregulated segment, where competition takes
place a` la Cournot. Then, if the merger is allowed, the outputs in market i are
q˜mcdirh =
(3− 2γ)(α− c)
3− 2γ2 − 3θh , q˜
mcd
irl =
(9− 4γ + 2γφ)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ ;
q˜mcdiuh =
6(1− γ − θh)(α− c)
9− 6γ2 − 9θh , q˜
mcd
iul =
6(1− γ − θl + ∆θφ)(α− c)
9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ .
The diversification into a Cournot segment crucially affects the regulatory pol-
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icy designed for the merged firm. When goods are substitutes, the efficient merged
firm has a stronger incentive to claim to be inefficient, since a lower regulated
quantity due to cost exaggeration improves the demand and the profits in the un-
regulated segment. In fact, the incentive constraint (1.12) is more severe than the
constraint (1.7). As Lemmas 2 and 3 reveal, the regulator reduces the quantity of
the efficient firm, q˜mcdirh < q˜
mc
irh, and it increases the quantity of the inefficient firm,
q˜mcdirl > q˜
mc
irl , in order to curb the informational rents in (1.12).
The reverse occurs when goods are complements. A lower regulated quantity
due to cost misrepresentation now reduces the demand and profits in the unreg-
ulated segment, which mitigates the regulator’s incentive problem. As Lemmas 2
and 3 indicate, the regulator prefers to increase the wedge between the regulated
output of the efficient firm and that of the inefficient firm, namely, q˜mcdirh > q˜
mc
irh and
q˜mcdirl < q˜
mc
irl , since this allows a higher rent extraction.
Equipped with the results in Lemma 3 and using (1.9), we can now formalize
the optimal merger policy in the presence of diversification into a Cournot segment.
Proposition 2 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and be-
comes private information of the merged firm after the merger. Moreover, suppose
that the merging firms diversify into the unregulated segment, where competition
takes place a` la Cournot. Then,
(i) when goods are substitutes, i.e., γ > 0, there exists a threshold θ∗h(γ) > 0
(where θ∗h = 0 if and only if γ = 0) such that for θh 6 θ∗h the merger is never ex
ante welfare enhancing. For θh > θ
∗
h the merger is ex ante welfare enhancing if
and only if φ(ν) > φ˜cd, where φ˜
c
d > 0 is given by
− (9− 4γ)2 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) θl
∆θ
[
2γ (57γ − 8γ3 − 54) + 3θh (9− 4γ)2
]
+ 2γ2
[
6 (1− γ)2 + θh (21 + 8γ2 − 24γ)
] ;
(1.15)
(ii) when goods are complements, i.e., γ < 0, the merger is ex ante welfare en-
hancing if and only if φ(ν) > φ˜cd.
We know from the discussion following Lemma 3 that the regulated firms’
diversification into a competitive segment complicates the regulator’s incentive
problem when goods are substitutes. As Proposition 2 reveals, if the magnitude
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of efficiency gains the merger may generate is small enough, the regulator prefers
to block the merger tout court. Otherwise, the merger is allowed if the probability
of efficiency gains is relatively high.
In order to further investigate the impact of diversification on the optimal
merger policy, we rewrite the merger condition under Bertrand competition in
(1.10) as
φ(ν) > −1− γ
2 − θh
θh∆θ
θl ≡ φ˜b = φ˜bd, (1.16)
where the equality indicates that diversification is inconsequential, and the merger
condition under Cournot competition in (1.11) as
φ(ν) > −9− 4γ
2 − 9θh
9θh∆θ
θl ≡ φ˜c. (1.17)
We can now state the following conclusion.
Proposition 3 Suppose that θ ∈ {θh, θl} is uncertain before the merger and be-
comes private information of the merged firm after the merger. Then, (i) when
goods are substitutes, i.e., γ > 0, we have φ˜cd > φ˜c > φ˜b, where the equality holds
if and only if γ = 0;
(ii) when goods are complements, i.e., γ < 0, we have φ˜cd < φ˜
c. Moreover,
there exists a threshold θ˜h(γ) > 0, with
∂θ˜h
∂γ
> 0, such that φ˜b > φ˜cd if and only if
θh < θ˜h.
As Figure 1.2 illustrates, when goods are substitutes the regulated firms’ di-
versification into a Cournot segment induces the regulator to establish a more
severe merger challenge rule. This is a consequence of the merged firm’s stronger
incentive to manipulate its private information about post-merger costs.
Things are different with complementary goods. The regulated firms’ diversifi-
cation under Cournot competition alleviates the regulator’s incentive problem and
therefore relaxes the optimal merger policy, i.e., φ˜cd < φ˜
c. The incentive benefits of
diversification can be so large that the results derived Proposition 1 are reversed,
and Cournot competition leads to a more lenient merger policy than Bertrand
competition, i.e., φ˜b > φ˜cd. Proposition 3 indicates that this is the case when
θh < θ˜h. As θ˜h increases with γ, this condition becomes more severe with closer
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γ0
φ(ν)
φ˜b
φ˜c
φ˜cd
Figure 1.2: Merger policy under diversification
complements. Since a higher degree of complementarity softens the optimal merger
policy irrespective of the mode of competition (∂φ˜
b
∂γ
> 0 and
∂φ˜cd
∂γ
> 0 for γ < 0),
we can conclude that, when goods are not close complements, the aforementioned
incentive benefits of diversification into a Cournot segment outweigh the allocative
benefits of Bertrand competition derived in Proposition 1. Conversely, when the
degree of complementarity is high enough, the latter benefits tend to prevail.
The result of a more lenient merger policy under Cournot competition is even
stronger in the presence of economies of scope between regulated and unregulated
activities. As Calzolari and Scarpa (2014) show, a lower regulated quantity due
to cost misrepresentation increases the (marginal) costs of unregulated operations,
which induces the Cournot competitors of the diversified regulated firm to expand
their production. Hence, Cournot competition mitigates the regulator’s incentive
problem and leads to a softer merger challenge rule.
1.7 Robustness
We discuss some assumptions of the model in order to gain insights into the ro-
bustness of the results.
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1.7.1 Efficiency gains
Following some relevant contributions about uncertain efficiency gains (e.g., Amir
et al. 2009; Chone´ and Linnemer 2008), we assume that antitrust authorities and
merging firms share the same beliefs about the realization of cost synergies. These
beliefs may arise from comparable mergers or post-merger simulations. One could
argue that the merging firms might acquire some private signals that allow them
to update their beliefs about cost synergies even before the merger. In practice,
antitrust authorities seek to extract any superior information of the merging firms
with the request of convincing documentation and reports about efficiency claims.
Our qualitative conclusions carry over even when the merging firms are better
informed than the regulator before the merger. The rationale is the following. As
we show in Section 1.7.2, the regulated firms are always willing to merge under
Bertrand competition, so that the regulator cannot update its beliefs after a merger
proposal. The same occurs under Cournot competition if goods are substitutes,
and therefore our results fully hold. With complementary goods, the regulator
might update its information after a merger proposal only in case of diversification.
This strengthens our result that the regulated firms’ expansion into a Cournot
segment mitigates the regulator’s incentive problem and leads to a more lenient
merger challenge rule.25
The main informational advantage of the merging firms is that they privately
learn the realization of post-merger costs. Abstracting from the complexities that
arise from regulatory limited commitment, one might claim that this type of in-
formational asymmetry is transitory by its very nature, since the regulator could
revise the regulatory policy and remove any distortion in the light of the informa-
tion acquired about efficiency gains. In this sense, our model provides a short-run
analysis. As Amir et al. (2009) argue, this approach is justified since the short-run
period is the main focus of merger investigations.26
25In practice, during a merger investigation antitrust authorities cannot design any contract
that provides transfer payments and penalties in order to induce information revelation. Even if
this were feasible, the full information outcome cannot be still achieved under some reasonable
assumptions, such as the firm’s limited liability.
26A long-run analysis is much more demanding, since it requires the identification of other
potential contributing factors, such as industry-specific or economy-wide shocks. This explains
why most empirical studies consider horizons extending only 3 to 5 years.
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Furthermore, our main results hinge upon the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion after the merger, which does not necessarily arise from synergies. Practitioners
recognize that a merger between regulated firms tends to aggravate the regulator’s
informational problem. This is because after the merger it becomes more cumber-
some to use benchmarking mechanisms in order to discipline the behavior of the
regulated firm.
1.7.2 Firms’ incentives to merge
Throughout the analysis we do not explicitly deal with the merger decision of
regulated firms. This point definitely deserves some discussion. In the absence of
diversification, it is immediate to see that the regulated firms have an incentive
to merge, since the merger entails (expected) informational rents from privileged
knowledge of efficiency gains.
This result clearly extends to the case of diversification into a Bertrand seg-
ment. To explore the diversified firms’ incentives to merge under Cournot com-
petition, we compare the expected profits from the merger with the profits in the
absence of the merger that only arise from competitive activities. Using the bind-
ing incentive constraint (1.12), a merger turns out to be profitable if and only
if
E
[
pimcdr + pi
11
(
q˜mcd1r
)
+ pi21
(
q˜mcd2r
)]
= ν∆θ
(
q˜mcd1rl
)2
+ 2pi11
(
q˜mcd1rl
)
> 2pi11 (qc1r) ,
where 2pi11(qc1r) is the aggregate profit from competitive activities in the absence of
the merger. Since the post-merger regulated output of the inefficient firm is lower
than the output without the merger, q˜mcdirl < q
c
ir, a merger is always proposed when
goods are substitutes. The rationale is that the merging firms obtain (expected)
informational rents from regulated activities and higher competitive profits. When
goods are complements, competitive profits decline after the merger. Hence, a
merger is profitable if the informational rents from regulated activities outweigh
the lower profits from competitive operations.
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1.8 Concluding remarks and policy implications
In this chapter we examine the welfare effects of a merger between regulated firms
in the presence of two relevant informational problems, namely, uncertainty and
asymmetric information about efficiency gains, when regulated firms interact with
unregulated competitors. The merger between regulated firms entails a trade-off
between the benefits of potential efficiency gains from joint production and the
costs of distortions in the regulatory policy due to informational problems about
post-merger costs. We show that, as a result of this trade-off, the optimal merger
policy depends on the intensity of competition between unregulated firms. In
particular, fiercer competition makes the optimal merger policy more lenient with
the merging regulated firms. The rationale is that fiercer competition induces a
more efficient response of unregulated firms to changes in their demand driven by
distortions in the regulatory policy due to informational problems. This reduces
the allocative costs of regulatory distortions and softens the optimal merger policy.
These results may be reversed if regulated firms diversify into the unregulated
part of the market. When regulated and unregulated goods exhibit some degree of
complementarity, the diversified merged firm has a weaker incentive to manipulate
its private information about efficiencies from the merger, since a lower regulated
quantity due to cost misrepresentation translates into lower demand and profits in
the competitive segment. Therefore, under complementarity, the regulated firm’s
internalization of competitive profits relaxes the regulator’s incentive problem, and
weaker competition (which generates higher profits) can lead to a more lenient
merger policy.
It is well established in the theoretical and practical debate that mergers in un-
regulated industries entail a trade-off between efficiency gains from joint produc-
tion and enhanced market power of merging firms, which results from a reduction
in the number of rivals competing in the market. Our analysis recommends that
the study of the intensity of competition should be extended to markets where
merging regulated firms interact with unregulated competitors.
Specifically, our results suggest that the merger policy involving regulated firms
should be more lenient in industries where liberalized segments of the market are
characterized by intense competition. This can be the case in energy sectors when
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liberalized retail services are highly competitive. In some circumstances, however,
competition in liberalized segments of the market is weak, for instance because of
severe capacity constraints. This can occur when unregulated competitors must
undertake huge investments. If regulated firms also engage in the provision of
unregulated services that are substitutes for the regulated ones, antitrust author-
ities should toughen their stance towards mergers between regulated firms. This
could apply to regulated transportation utilities that also provide unregulated bus
services. Conversely, if regulated firms also provide goods which are complements
for the regulated ones, the merger between regulated firms should be assessed
more favorably. This can be the case of local exchange carriers that also provide
long-distance telephone services or telephone equipment.
This conclusion warrants a remark. In our analysis, we consider mergers be-
tween regulated firms which are active in different regions and may diversify into
a competitive segment of the market where they operate. When a regulated firm
expands into a competitive part of the market where the other firm is established,
a merger clearly exhibits an anticompetitive concern stemming from the enhanced
market power in the unregulated segment. In this case, antitrust authorities might
approve the merger conditionally upon some structural remedies, such as the di-
vestiture of one competitive subsidiary.
1.9 Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Remark 1. If the merger is not allowed, the two markets are fully sep-
arated. Replacing Tir with piir from (1.2), the regulator’s objective of maximizing
welfare in market i is given by
max
qir,piir
(α− c)qir + αqkiu −
1
2
q2ir −
1
2
(qkiu)
2 − γqirqkiu − pkiuqkiu − piir s.t. piir > 0,
where qkiu(qir), k = b, c, is the unregulated output in the competition stage and
pkiu(·) is the associated price. Under Bertrand competition, using qbiu(qir) = α−c−
γqir with p
b
iu = c and taking the first-order condition for qir yields q
b
ir = q
b
iu =
α−c
1+γ
.
Welfare without the merger is CSb = 2(α−c)
2
1+γ
. Under Cournot competition, using
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qciu(qir) =
2
3
(α − c − γqir) with pciu = α − qciu(·) − γqir and taking the first-order
condition for qir yields q
c
ir =
(9−4γ)(α−c)
9−4γ2 and q
c
iu =
6(1−γ)(α−c)
9−4γ2 . Welfare without
merger is CSc = 4(α−c)
2
9
+ (9−4γ)
2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) .
If the merger is allowed, after replacing Tr with pir from (1.3), the regulator’s
problem of maximizing welfare in (1.4) can be written as
max
qir,pir
∑2
i=1
[
(α− c) qir + αqkiu −
1
2
q2ir −
1
2
(
qkiu
)2 − γqirqkiu − pkiuqkiu]+ θq1rq2r − pir
s.t. pir > 0.
Under Bertrand competition, using qbiu(qir) = α − c − γqir with pbiu = c yields
qmbir =
(1−γ)(α−c)
1−γ2−θ and q
mb
iu =
(1−γ−θ)(α−c)
1−γ2−θ , which entails CS
mb = (2−2γ−θ)(α−c)
2
1−γ2−θ .
Under Cournot competition, using qciu(qir) =
2
3
(α − c − γqir) with pciu = α −
qciu(·)− γqir yields qmcir = (9−4γ)(α−c)9−4γ2−9θ and qmciu = 6(1−γ−θ)(α−c)9−4γ2−9θ , which entails CSmc =
4(α−c)2
9
+ (9−4γ)
2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θ) . It follows that CS
mb − CSb = (1−γ)(α−c)2θ
(1−γ2−θ)(1+γ) > (<)0 and
CSmc − CSc = (9−4γ)2(α−c)2θ
(9−4γ2−9θ)(9−4γ2) > (<)0 if and only if θ = θh(θl).
Proof of Lemma 1. As the regulator is fully informed in the regulatory stage,
the regulatory outcomes in the proof of Remark 1 still hold. However, the reg-
ulator’s merger decision now occurs before costs are realized. Under Bertrand
competition, expected welfare from the merger is E
[
CSmb
]
= ν (2−2γ−θh)(α−c)
2
1−γ2−θh +
(1− ν) (2−2γ−θl)(α−c)2
1−γ2−θl . Then, we find E
[
CSmb
]
> CSb if and only if condition
(1.5) in the lemma holds. Under Cournot competition, expected welfare from the
merger is E [CSmc] = 4(α−c)
2
9
+ ν (9−4γ)
2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θh) + (1− ν)
(9−4γ)2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2−9θl) , and we find
E[CSmc] > CSc if and only if condition (1.6) in the lemma holds. Using the regu-
latory outcomes in the proof of Remark 1, the positivity conditions on quantities
entail νb ∈ (0, 1) and νc ∈ (0, 1). Standard computations yield νc > νb, where the
equality holds if and only if γ = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. The incentive constraint (1.7) and the participation con-
straint pirl ≥ 0 imply pirh ≥ 0, which is therefore slack in equilibrium. Moreover,
conditions (1.7) and pirl ≥ 0 must be binding at the optimal contract, otherwise
the regulator could increase welfare via an adequate reduction in the firm’s trans-
fers. We check ex post that the incentive constraint (1.8) is satisfied, which is the
case if and only if the monotonicity condition q1rhq2rh > q1rlq2rl (that follows from
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adding (1.7) and (1.8)) holds. Substituting the binding constraints into (1.4), the
regulator’s maximization problem can be written after some manipulation as
max
qirh,qirl
ν
{∑2
i=1
[
(α− c) qirh + αqkiuh −
1
2
q2irh −
1
2
(
qkiuh
)2 − γqirhqkiuh − pkiuhqkiuh]
+θhq1rhq2rh −∆θq1rlq2rl}+ (1− ν)×{∑2
i=1
[
(α− c) qirl + αqkiul −
1
2
q2irl −
1
2
(
qkiul
)2 − γqirlqkiul − pkiulqkiul]+ θlq1rlq2rl} .
Under Bertrand competition, using qbiu (qir) = α−c−γqir with pbiu = c and tak-
ing the first-order conditions for qirh and qirl yields (1− γ) (α− c)− (1− γ2) qirh+
θhqjrh = 0 and (1− γ) (α− c) − (1− γ2) qirl + θlqjrl − ∆θφqjrl = 0, i, j = 1, 2,
i 6= j. Under Cournot competition, using qciu (qir) = 23 (α− c− γqir) with pciu =
α − qciu (.) − γqir and taking the first-order conditions for qirh and qirl yields
(9− 4γ) (α− c)−(9− 4γ2) qirh+9θhqjrh = 0 and (9− 4γ) (α− c)−(9− 4γ2) qirl+
9θlqjrl − 9∆θφqjrl = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. Usual substitutions imply the results in
the lemma. Since q1rhq2rh > q1rlq2rl holds, condition (1.8) is also met.
Proof of Proposition 1. From Lemma 2 we find that expected welfare C˜S
mb
from the merger under Bertrand competition can be written as
(α− c)2 + ν(1− γ)
2(α− c)2
1− γ2 − θh +
(1− ν)(1− γ)2(α− c)2
1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ
= (α− c)2 + (1− γ
2 − θh + ∆θφ)(1− γ)2(α− c)2
(1− γ2 − θh)(1− γ2 − θl + ∆θφ) .
From the proof of Remark 1 we know that welfare without the merger is CSb =
2(α−c)2
1+γ
. It follows that C˜S
mb
> CSb if and only if condition (1.10) in the proposi-
tion holds.
Expected welfare C˜S
mc
from the merger under Cournot competition can be
written as
4(α− c)2
9
+
ν(9− 4γ)2(α− c)2
9(9− 4γ2 − 9θh) +
(1− ν)(9− 4γ)2(α− c)2
9(9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ)
=
4(α− c)2
9
+
(9− 4γ2 − 9θh + 9∆θφ)(9− 4γ)2(α− c)2
9(9− 4γ2 − 9θh)(9− 4γ2 − 9θl + 9∆θφ) . (1.18)
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From the proof of Remark 1 we know that welfare without the merger is CSc =
4(α−c)2
9
+ (9−4γ)
2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) . It follows that C˜S
mc
> CSc if and only if condition (1.11)
in the proposition holds. Using the results in Lemma 2, the positivity conditions
on quantities entail ν˜b ∈ (νb, 1) and ν˜c ∈ (νc, 1). From (1.5) and (1.10) we obtain
ν˜b − νb = −(1−γ2−θh)2θhθl
(1−γ2)[θ2h−(1−γ2)θl]∆θ
. Moreover, from (1.6) and (1.11) we find ν˜c − νc =
−(9−4γ2−9θh)2θhθl
(9−4γ2)[9θ2h−(9−4γ2)θl]∆θ
. Standard computations entail ν˜c − νc > ν˜b − νb, where the
equality holds if and only if γ = 0. Combining terms yields the result in the
proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1 . We know from the proof of Proposition 1 that ∆νb ≡
ν˜b − νb = −(1−γ2−θh)2θhθl
(1−γ2)[θ2h−(1−γ2)θl]∆θ
and ∆νc ≡ ν˜c − νc = −(9−4γ2−9θh)2θhθl
(9−4γ2)[9θ2h−(9−4γ2)θl]∆θ
. For θ =
0.5θh+0.5θl, differentiating ∆ν
b with respect to θh entails after some manipulation
θ4h(3Γb + θh) + 4θ
3
Γb(Γb − 3θh) + 2θθh(θ2h + 11θhΓb − 2Γ2b)
+θθ2h(Γ
2
b − 15θhΓb − 2θ2h)
2(θh − Γb)−1Γb(θ − θh)2[2Γbθ − θh(Γb + θh)]2
,
where Γb ≡ 1− γ2. Standard computations show that this expression is positive if
θh is not too high (given the assumptions on the parameters of the model).
For θ = 0.5θh + 0.5θl, differentiating ∆ν
c with respect to θh entails after some
manipulation
27θ4h(Γc + 3θh) + 4θ
3
Γc(Γc − 27θh) + 2θθh(81θ2h + 99θhΓc − 2Γ2c)
+θθ2h(Γ
2
c − 135θhΓc − 162θ2h)
2(9θh − Γc)−1Γc(θ − θh)2[2Γcθ − θh(Γc + 9θh)]2
,
where Γc ≡ 9− 4γ2. Standard computations show that this expression is positive
if θh is not too high (given the assumptions on the parameters of the model).
Proof of Lemma 3. In line with the proof of Lemma 2, we consider the incentive
constraint (1.12) and the participation constraint pirl > 0 binding at the optimal
contract, otherwise the regulator could increase welfare via a reduction in the
firm’s transfers. We check ex post that the incentive constraint (1.13) is satisfied,
which is the case if and only if the monotonicity condition (1.14) holds, and that
the participation constraint pirh > 0 is also satisfied. Substituting the binding
35
CHAPTER 1
constraints into (1.4), the regulator’s maximization problem becomes
max
qirh,qirl
ν
{∑2
i=1
[
(α− c) qirh + αqkiuh −
1
2
q2irh −
1
2
(
qkiuh
)2 − γqirhqkiuh − pkiuhqkiuh]
+θhq1rhq2rh −∆θq1rlq2rl − γ
9
∑2
i=1
(2α− 2c− γqirh − γqirl) (qirh − qirl)
}
+ (1− ν)
×
{∑2
i=1
[
(α− c) qirl + αqkiul −
1
2
q2irl −
1
2
(
qkiul
)2 − γqirlqkiul − pkiulqkiul]+ θlq1rlq2rl} .
Using the Cournot outcome qciu(qir) =
2
3
(α−c−γqir) with pciu = α−qciu(·)−γqir, the
first-order conditions for qirh and qirl are (9−6γ)(α− c)− (9−4γ2)qirh + 9θhqjrh +
2γ2qirh = 0 and (9 − 4γ)(α − c) − (9 − 4γ2)qirl + 9θlqjrl − 9∆θφqjrl − 2γ2φqirl =
0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, respectively. Usual substitutions imply the results in the
lemma. For γ > 0, sufficient condition for (1.14) to be satisfied is θl 6 13(
√
3− 2).
Alternatively, we must have θh > 2γ 1−γ9−4γ . For γ < 0, condition (1.14) is always
satisfied. Furthermore, for γ > 0, the participation constraint pirh > 0 is always
satisfied. For γ < 0, sufficient, but not necessary, condition for pirh > 0 to be
satisfied is that |γ| is not too high.
Proof of Proposition 2. It follows from Lemma 3 expected welfare C˜S
mcd
from
the merger is given by
4(α− c)2
9
+
ν(3− 2γ)2(α− c)2
3(3− 2γ2 − 3θh) +
(1− ν)(9− 4γ + 2γφ)2(α− c)2
9[9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ] .
Combining terms yields
4(α− c)2
9
+
[(9− 4γ)2 + 4γ2φ](3− 2γ2 − 3θh) + 3(3− 2γ)2(2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ
9(3− 2γ2 − 3θh)[9− 4γ2 − 9θl + (2γ2 + 9∆θ)φ] (α− c)
2.
(1.19)
From the proof of Remark 1 we know that welfare in the absence of the merger is
CSc = 4(α−c)
2
9
+ (9−4γ)
2(α−c)2
9(9−4γ2) . Taking the difference between C˜S
mcd
and CSc, we
obtain after some manipulation
9 (9− 4γ)2 (3− 2γ2 − 3θh) θl + φ{∆θ [2γ (57γ − 8γ3 − 54)+ 3θh (9− 4γ)2]
+2γ2
[
6 (1− γ)2 + θh
(
21 + 8γ2 − 24γ)]} ,
which is negative if the expression in curly brackets is negative. When goods are
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substitutes, i.e., γ > 0, this is the case for θh 6 θ∗h(γ), with
θ∗h ≡
4γ − 4γ2 + 9θl − 4γθl
2(9− 4γ) +√
9θl[8γ(2γ − 3θl)− 3(8γ − 9θl)] + 16γ2θl[2γ(3− 2γ) + 3θl]
2
√
3(9− 4γ)
> 0,
where the equality holds if and only if γ = 0. For θh > θ
∗
h, we have C˜S
mcd
> CSc if
and only if condition (1.15) in the proposition holds. When goods are complements,
i.e., γ < 0, the expression in curly brackets is always positive. Then, we find
C˜S
mcd
> CSc if and only if condition (1.15) holds.
Proof of Proposition 3. Taking the difference between C˜S
mcd
in (1.19) and
C˜S
mc
in (1.18) yields C˜S
mcd− C˜Smc S 0 if and only if γ T 0. This is because the
regulator faces the same maximization problem, subject to the same participation
constraints, while the incentive constraint (1.12) is stronger (weaker) than (1.7)
for γ > (<) 0 (the constraints (1.8) and (1.13) are implied by the monotonicity
condition (1.14)). Then, we have φ˜cd T φ˜c if and only if γ T 0. Alternatively, this
result follows from the comparison between (1.15) and (1.17). Using Proposition
1, we find for γ > 0 that φ˜cd > φ˜c > φ˜b, where the equality holds if and only
if γ = 0. For γ < 0, using (1.15) and (1.16), we find φ˜b > φ˜cd if and only if
θh < θ˜h(γ), where θ˜h ≡ 2(1−γ2)(54−57γ+8γ3)3[36−γ(65−24γ)] > 0. Standard computations yield
∂θ˜h
∂γ
= 6 (65−48γ)(54−57γ−54γ
2+65γ3−8γ5)
(108−195γ+72γ2)2 − 257+108γ−195γ
2+40γ4
108−195γ+72γ2 > 0, where the inequality
follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model.
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Mergers with structural remedies
in a Cournot oligopoly
2.1 Introduction
Since the 1990s, when firms intend to merge, in addition to the “traditional” option
to provide a merger proposal that the antitrust authority can either clear or block,
the firms can also provide a merger proposal with remedies (or “commitments”),
so that the antitrust authority can approve it in line with remedies. In the Eu-
ropean Union, after the European Commission’s “Notice on remedies”(2001), and
in the US, after the Federal Trade Commission’s “A Study of the Commission’s
Divestiture Process”(1999), a considerable proportion of mergers is approved with
remedies. For example, the European Commission’s Commission Staff Working
Document (2014) states that “commitments are crucial instruments of merger con-
trol, since the large majority of cases that raise competition concerns are cleared
with commitments rather than prohibited”. There are similar trends in merger
cases outside the European Union and the US.
The purpose of remedies is that if the antitrust authority has concerns that
a full merger may significantly affect competition in the common market (or a
substantial part of it), certain modifications via remedies can guarantee continued
competition. If the merger is cleared, it may impede competition, but if it is
blocked, society cannot enjoy efficiency gains from the merger. Hence, a merger
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with remedies can be a golden mean between full merger and no merger.
There are two types of remedies: structural remedies and behavioral remedies.
There is no generally accepted definition of structural and behavioral remedies in
the literature. In this chapter we use the definitions formulated by Motta et al.
(2003). Structural remedies modify the allocation of property rights and create
new firms or enhance one or more existing firms. They include the divestiture of
an entire on-going business or partial divestiture. Behavioral remedies entail the
limitation of the merged entity’s conduct.
Although both types of remedies have their pros and cons, there is a con-
sensus that competitive concerns in horizontal mergers can be solved better by
a structural remedy (OECD 2011). The EU Remedy Notice (2008) states that
“the most effective way to restore effective competition, apart from prohibition,
is to create the conditions for the emergence of a new competitive entity or for
the strengthening of existing competitors via divestiture”. On the other hand,
behavioral remedies would absorb the scarce resources of the antitrust authority
since they require intensive monitoring. The remedial action chosen by the Federal
Trade Commission in the US follows a relatively similar pattern. The empirical
literature, as summarized in the Table 2.1 by Bougette and Turolla (2008), has
also shown that structural remedies constitute the most frequent type of remedies.
Structural Behavioral Mixed Total
Phase I (in percentage of Phase I) 62 (54) 36 (31) 17 (15) 115
Phase II (in percentage of Phase II) 26 (36) 18 (25) 28 (39) 72
Total 88 54 45 187
Table 2.1: Types of remedies in the European merger cases (1990-2005)
This chapter investigates structural remedies, with a focus on divestitures of
one special form of assets: the divestiture of differentiated brands to an existing
competitor. According to the merger guidelines issued by the UK Competition
Commission (2008), “remedies that provide access to intellectual property (IP)
by licensing or assignment of patents, brands or other IP rights may be viewed in
general as a specialized form of asset divestiture”. Mergers with brand divestitures
are quite common nowadays, especially in large mergers. A prominent example is
the acquisition of EMI Music by Universal Music Group, two of the four global
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major record companies with a value of $1.9 billion in 2012. In compliance with
the conditions of the European Commission, Universal Music Group sold Mute
catalogue to BMG, which constitutes the first completed divestment from EMI
Music buyout. Moreover, the merged entity sold Parlophone Music Group (minus
the Beatles) to Warner Music Group and numerous other music brands to other
existing competitors or new firms.
Williamson (1968) investigates the welfare trade-off between market power and
efficiency gains generated by a merger. We prove that, in line with merger cases
in the recent 20 years, remedies in merger policy are powerful tools to lessen the
merged entity’s market power. We investigate the important role of remedies
in merger policy which can increase the scope for privately and socially desirable
mergers. In particular, we show that when goods are closer to perfect substitutabil-
ity, then the merging firms are more inclined to give some brands to competitor(s),
because the markup on each brand is lower. Therefore the range of the efficiency
gains which allows the merger with remedies to be approved is larger.
Despite of the practical evidence and the empirical case studies about the
impact of remedies (e.g., Duso et al. 2011, 2013), still not enough attention has
been devoted to the theoretical analysis of structural remedies.
Medvedev (2007) shows that if there are three firms in a homogenous good
market, the remedies with efficiency gains could extend the scope for merger ac-
ceptance. We extend this result to a differentiated good market and discuss the
case of more than three firms. Vasconcelos (2010) analyzes remedies for four firms
with efficiency gains. He finds that remedies may not serve consumer surplus as
the antitrust authority is overshooting in terms of consumer protection, and an
“over-fixing problem” can be caused by the antitrust authority. This phenomenon
emerges when the antitrust authority over-fixes the anticompetitive effects of a
merger and requires remedies even if the original merger (if unconditionally ap-
proved) would be consumer surplus improving. In our chapter, we abstract from
this “over-fixing problem”, because in line with the antitrust practices in most in-
dustrialized countries, we focus on the merger process instead of antitrust process,
which implies that remedies are endogenously provided by merging firms.
Cabral (2003) analyzes mergers in a differentiated industry with free entry. If
assets are sold to an entrant firm as a remedy, then a “buy them off” effect follows
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which means that an entrant firm is dissuaded from opening a new store (or intro-
ducing a new product variant). That effect may reduce the welfare of consumers,
who are better off when more variants are offered. On the contrary, Dertwinkel-
Kalt and Wey (2015) analyze the effects of structural remedies on merger activity
in a Cournot oligopoly with a homogenous good and find that the divestiture to
an entrant firm is most effective in terms of consumer surplus. Our model focuses
on the divestiture to the existing competitor(s) and excludes the entrant firm(s),
so we can avoid this “buy them off”effect. This assumption is also in line with
the empirical literatures (e.g., Papandropoulos and Tajana 2006) that most of new
entrants cannot survive in the market for long time even when they are given the
divestitures by the merged entities.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the basic model.
Section 2.3 provides the no merger case as a benchmark. Section 2.4 analyzes
the conditions for approving a merger when there are three pre-merger firms and
divestiture is given. Section 2.5 considers conducts the optimal divestiture which
is endogenously proposed by merging firms. Section 2.6 studies a more general
setting where before merger there are four firms in a market. Finally, section
2.7 concludes and provides some future research directions. All formal proofs are
collected in the Appendix.
2.2 The model
Setting There are three symmetric Cournot oligopolists indexed by j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
in a market. Each firm produces n > 2 brands of substitute goods. To simplify
the notation, firm j produces the jth n brands, so in total there are 3n brands
produced in the market.1 Consider a one-shot bilateral merger with firm 1 as an
acquirer and firm 2 as a target firm. We model the efficiency gains in a reduced
form, as the merged entity enjoys the efficiency gains X > 0 from the merger. For
example, X can be treated as efficiency gains based on the saving of fixed cost.
Assume that the brands of the target firm may be given to the competitor, firm
1One brand is associated with one good.
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3.2 The number of brands that the merged entity keeps is k, where k ∈ (n, 2n].
Following Shubik and Levitan (1980), the gross consumer surplus is specified
as
U(q1, · · · , q3n) =
3n∑
i=1
qi − 3n
2(1 + µ)
 3n∑
i=1
q2i +
µ
3n
(
3n∑
i=1
qi
)2 , (2.1)
where qi is the quantity of the ith brand, and µ > 0 represents the degree of
substitutability within the 3n brands.3
Maximizing the utility function (2.1) subject to the income constraint yields
the inverse demand function
pi(q1, · · · , q3n) = 1− 1
1 + µ
(
3nqi + µ
3n∑
l=1
ql
)
. (2.2)
Firm j’s profit is
Πj =
B∑
i=1
[pi(q1, · · · , q3n)qi] , (2.3)
where B is the number of brands that firm j has.4
Timing and equilibrium concept The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
(I) Merging firms hand in merger proposal (with or without remedies) to the
antitrust authority.
(II) The antitrust authority decides whether to approve the merger or not.
(III) Competition takes place.
This timing is in line with the European Commission’s Merger Control Pro-
cedures5 and reflects merging procedures in most countries and areas. In the
2In practice, the merged entity should sell their divestitures to other firm(s). However, in
our model there is no discount factor of the transaction, so the transfer of trading divestiture is
completely internalized in social welfare. Moreover, we exclude the free entry. So firm 3 is the
unique possible firm which can get divestures from the merged entity.
3Consumers preferences can be expressed as V = U + y, so a partial equilibrium analysis is
fully justified.
4The cost is normalized to 0.
5Here we only focus on “Phase I” stage and ignore “Phase II” stage in the EU, because there
are very few merger cases go to “Phase II”stage, for example, Verge (2010) shows that 3.4% of
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following, we emphasize some remarks.
It is important to distinguish between merger process and antitrust process.
This paper focuses on the merger process. The crucial difference is that in the
merger process the merging firms provide a merger proposal (with or without
remedies), and then the antitrust authority decides to approve or block it. In the
antitrust process, the antitrust authority assigns firms some remedial requirements.
Put differently, in the merger process, the merger policy is not an industrial policy,
the antitrust authority is not an industrial regulator, and the antitrust authority’s
purpose is not to re-structure the post-merger market. This is consistent with
the merger procedures in most countries and areas. For example, the European
Commission (2013) states that “if the Commission has concerns that the merger
may significantly affect competition, the merging companies may offer remedies
(“commitments”), i.e., propose certain modifications to the project that would
guarantee continued competition on the market”.6 Therefore during the merging
procedure the antitrust authority will not increase “over-fixing” stage problem
mentioned in some contributions (e.g., Nocke and Whinston 2010), it only has a
veto over merger proposals.7
The object of the antitrust authority is social welfare. This is in line with
the antitrust practice in some countries, such as in Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, the antitrust authorities lean to a social welfare standard (Motta 2004,
Ch. 1). Secondly, even in the EU and the US where the antitrust authorities tend
to adopt a consumer surplus standard, in some cases, they review mergers under
a different (public interest) standard and the interactions among agencies with
overlapping jurisdictions affect the review process in various ways (e.g., European
Commission 2004, Article 11).
In principle, remedial divestiture can be assigned to already existing competi-
tor(s) or to new entrant(s). In this paper, we only consider the merger with
divestiture to an existing competitor. This assumption rules out the “buy them
mergers notified between 1999 and 2008 went into Phase II. Moreover, the rules in “Phase I”
stage and “Phase II” stage are slightly different. In “Phase II” stage, merging firms and the
antitrust authorities may bargain over remedies (Wood 2003). In the US, the similar two-stage
procedure is called “First Request” stage and “Second Request” stage.
6Emphasis added.
7At least in “Phase I” stage.
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off” effect described in Cabral (2003), which means an new entrant is unwilling to
introduce a new product variant. Moreover, most of new entrants cannot survive
in the market for long time (e.g., Papandropoulos and Tajana 2006).
We adopt the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) as the equilibrium
concept and solve the game with backward induction.
2.3 No merger
The benchmark solution is the three-firm Cournot oligopoly equilibrium without
merger.
Lemma 4 The pre-merger firm’s profit is piNM = [(1 + µ)(3 + µ)] / [(6 + 4µ)2].
The pre-merger social welfare is SWNM = UNM = [3(1 + µ)(9 + 5µ)] / [2(6 + 4µ)2].
Lemma 4 does not only shows the equilibrium of pre-merger market, but also
unfolds the results when the antitrust authority blocks the merger.
2.4 Merger with given divestiture
The number of brands that the merged entity can keep is k ∈ (n, 2n]. When
k = 2n, it is a full merger (merger without remedies). On the other hand, k must
be higher than n, because brands are only given from target firm (firm 2) and no
merged entity keeps less brands than what the pre-merger acquirer (firm 1) has.
Lemma 5 The antitrust authority approves merger with a given divestiture, if and
only if
X > UNM − U(k) ≡ X∗U(k). (2.4)
The function X∗U(k) plays a crucial role in the analysis and therefore we discuss
its properties. X∗U(k) = U
NM −U(k) is U -shaped and symmetric at k = 3
2
n. This
follows because U(k) is inverted U -shaped, symmetric and maximized at k = 3
2
n.
From a consumers’ point of view, the “best” result is that the two post-merger
firms share these 3n brands equally. The further k departs from 3
2
n (whatever
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X∗U(k)
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Figure 2.1: Merger with exogenous divestiture
to which direction), the smaller consumers’ utility. More precisely, if the merged
entity keeps (3
2
n + d) brands, where d ∈ (0, 1
2
n), the unique competitor will keep
(3
2
n− d) brands, because the number of total brands does not change before and
after merger. Then the antitrust authority, which cares about the social welfare,
is indifferent whether the merged entity or the competitor keeps (3
2
n− d) varieties
and (3
2
n+ d) varieties, respectively.
Given k, the antitrust authority can determine the value of X∗U(k). Then, as
long as X > X∗U(k), i.e., the condition (2.4) is fulfilled, the antitrust authority
approves the merger with remedies, as showed in the area above the curve X∗U(k)
in Figure 2.1. When k = 3
2
n, the two post-merger firms share the brands equally.
This is the best scenario for consumers, and the requirement for the efficiency
gains is the most relaxed. When k = n or k = 2n, they are the symmetrically
worst cases for consumers, so the antitrust authority sets the hardest condition
on the efficiency gains to the merging entity. When the efficiency gains X cannot
fulfill the antitrust authority’s conditions, which is the white area below the curve
X∗U(k), the merged entity’s lessened market power by remedies still overwhelms the
efficiency gains from merger, so that the social welfare is reduces and the merger
is blocked even with remedies.
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2.5 Merger with endogenous divestiture
We next consider the case where the divestiture to a competitor is endogenously
proposed by merging firms. The merging firms’ purpose is to find the optimally ac-
ceptable brands they will keep to maximize the merged entity’s profit, which means
first the merging firms have incentive to merge, second the antitrust authority ap-
proves the merger. The constraint (2.4) still works in this section, meanwhile
another constraint ensures that the merging firms have incentives to hand in the
merger proposal, which means the the merged entity’s net profit is not less than
their joint pre-merger profits,
Πm(k) +X > 2ΠNM . (2.5)
Rewriting constraint (2.5) yields
X > 2ΠNM − Πm(k) ≡ X∗Π(k). (2.6)
X∗Π(k) is decreasing in k, because Πm(k) is increasing in k. This indicates that
the more brands the merged entity can keep, the higher profit it gets, as it can
produce more brands with the efficiency gains X. The higher profit induces that
the merging firms set more relaxed barrier to hand in their proposal.
The merging firms’ maximization problem is
max
k
Πm(k) +X s.t. (2.4) and (2.6).
According to the features of Πm(k) discussed above, if there were no constraints
on merging firms, one can get the optimal solution immediately: k∗ = 2n, which
means that the merged entity keeps all brands from both the acquirer and the
target firm. Therefore, this maximization problem can be translated into two
steps. First, the merging firms find out the feasible and acceptable range of k.
Second, the maximal k from the range is the optimal solution of the maximization
problem.
Proposition 4 The merger decisions with optimal endogenous divestiture are fol-
lowing:
A. The merger without remedies (full merger) is cleared if and only if X > X∗U(2n).
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Figure 2.2: the merger case without remedies
B. The merger with remedies (the divestiture of brands to the existing competitor)
is cleared if
(i) µ < µ1 and X ∈ [X∗U(k˜), X∗U(2n)), where k˜ ∈ (32n, 2n) and µ1 = 12(7 +
√
97);
(ii) µ > µ1 and X ∈ [X∗U(32n), X∗U(2n))
The merged entity has max
{
X∗−1U (X),
3
2
n
}
brands.
C. The merger is blocked if
(i) µ < µ1 and X ∈ (0, X∗U(k˜)), where k˜ ∈ (32n, 2n);
(ii) µ > µ1 and X ∈ (0, X∗U(32n)).
When constraints (2.4) and (2.6) are both fulfilled, the efficiency gains X must
locate above both curves X∗Π(k) and X
∗
U(k). In the following, we first explain
Proposition 4 with figures.
Figure 2.2 shows the case that the merging firms only provide a full merger
proposal and the antitrust authority always approves the merger. For example, if
the merging firms’ efficiency gains is X = X1, the feasible range of the number
of brands that they can keep is k ∈ [k1, 2n]. In the feasible range, the optimal k
to maximize the merging firms’ profit is 2n. This rationale that the full merger is
approved goes through when X > X∗Π(2n). In this case, the antitrust authority
welcomes mergers more than the firms, because the the condition that the antitrust
authority sets to the efficiency gains is always lower than the one set by firms. So
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as long as efficiency gains are not high enough, i.e., X < X∗Π(2n), firms will not
provide merger proposals at all. Based on the form of the utility function and the
conditions on the parameters, this case does not hold, i.e., it is impossible that
the merging firms only face two options: a full merger and no merger. There are
always some scopes for a merger with remedies. In the following, we consider the
possible merger cases with remedies.
k
X
X∗U(k)
X∗Π(k)
n 3
2
n 2nk˜
X∗U(k˜)
X∗U(2n)
(a) when two crossing points in ( 32n, 2n)
k
X
X∗U(k)
X∗Π(k)
n 3
2
n 2nk˜
X∗U(k˜)
X∗U(2n)
(b) unique crossing point in ( 32n, 2n)
Figure 2.3: the merger case with partial remedies
Figure 2.3 shows that when µ is low enough, i.e., µ < µ1, there is one crossing
point k = k˜ lies between 3
2
n and 2n, whatever there is another crossing point lies
between (n, 3
2
n) or not. In these two cases, we can divide X into three ranges.
When X is high enough, i.e. X > X∗U(2n), the full merger is approved. When
X is at the middle range, i.e. X∗U(k˜) 6 X < X∗U(2n), merger with remedies
are approved and k = X∗−1U (X) and k ∈ [k˜, 2n). When X is low enough, i.e.
X < X∗U(k˜), merger is blocked or the firms do not provide any merger proposal.
This shows that although we define the range of k as (n, 2n], actually the feasible
range is k ∈ [3
2
n, 2n], because k ∈ [k˜, 2n) ⊂ [3
2
n, 2n]. The intuition is that remedies
are proposed by merging firms. Put differently, the “worst acceptable” remedies
that merging firms can make is to keep 3
2
n varieties, i.e., to have same number of
brands as their unique competitor after merger.
The rationale is same as the following two cases showed in Figure 2.4. The
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Figure 2.4: the merger case with all possible remedies
condition on the efficiency gains for the full merger does not change. Because the
two cases showed in Figure 2.4 indicate the situation that µ is high enough, i.e.,
the brands are closer to perfect substitutes, then the competition between the two
firms after merger is lighter than the one with more independent goods, the ranges
of approved merger with remedies are enlarged and the ranges of block the merger
are smaller than Figure 2.3, as showed in Figure 2.4 the entire range of [3
2
n, 2n] is
feasible for merger with remedies.
Simplifying the cases showed in Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 , one can focus on
range k ∈ [3
2
n, 2n] and get Figure 2.5. The thick curves show the paths of optimal
k.
Summarizing Proposition 4, we have Table 2.2.
block merger with remedies full merger
µ < µ1 X ∈ (0, X∗U(k˜)) X ∈ [X∗U(k˜), X∗U(2n)) X ∈ [X∗U(2n),∞)
µ > µ1 X ∈ (0, X∗U(32n)) X ∈ [X∗U(32n), X∗U(2n))
Table 2.2: The conditions for mergers in 3-pre-merger-firms case
Table 2.2 shows clearly that, without remedies, the merger is privately and
socially desirable only when the efficiency gains X is high enough, merger with
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Figure 2.5: The path of optimal k
remedies is a powerful and efficient tool to lessen the merged entity’s market power,
so that the requirement on efficiency gains to approve the merger is much lower. As
a consequence, merger with remedies increases the scope for privately and socially
desirable mergers.
Another significant difference between our model and the most of existing the-
oretical literatures on merger with remedies is that we consider the differentiated
goods rather than homogenous goods. As Proposition 4 shows, the degree of sub-
stitutability µ also plays an important role in the merger policy. When µ is high
enough, i.e., the brands are closer to the perfect substitutes goods, the scope of ap-
proved merger is larger than the case that the brands are closer to the independent
goods. One intuition might be that when the brands are closer to independent
goods, then the requirements on approving merger should be lighter, and our result
is counterintuitive. But that intuition is not complete. In our model, we consider
that all the brands in the market are symmetrical substitutes goods, so the brands
that the competitor are also the substitutes goods. And this is why we have that
when µ is higher than the benchmark µ1, the range of approved merger is larger.
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2.6 Extensions
If the number of firms is higher than three, the merging firms does not only decide
how many divestitures gives to competitor(s), but also how to distribute a certain
amount of divestitures among competitors. Consider now four symmetric pre-
merger firms. All the assumptions are same as in the case of three pre-merger
firms, but the total number of brands in the market is 4n now. Consider a one-
shot merger between firm 1 as an acquirer and firm 2 as a target firm. The merged
entity has two options: either to give divestitures to one of the two competitors,
namely, firm 3, or to divide divestitures to both competitors, firm 3 and firm 4.
Lemma 6 If there are four symmetric pre-merger firms,
A. When µ > µ¯(n), the merged entity gives the divestitures to only one competitor.
B. When µ < µ¯(n), the merged entity gives the divestitures symmetrically to both
competitor.
Lemma 6 shows the benchmark of two extreme cases, the merged entity either
gives the divestitures to one competitor or shares the divestitures equally between
the two competitors. The intuition is that, when the brands are closer to perfect
substitutes, the merged entity prefers to give the divestitures to one competitor,
in the sense that only makes one competitor more efficient and keeps another
one same as pre-merger. When the brands are closer to independent goods, the
merged entity prefers the more symmetric competition in the market. Moreover,
when the merged entity gives the divestitures to only one competitor, it is similar
with Proposition 4, only the values of benchmarks change. When the merged
entity gives the divestitures to both competitor, another question arises: how
to distribute a certain amount of divestitures among competitors, which is more
complicated. The intuitions are following. The “best” result for consumers should
be all the three post-merger firms share the brands equally,so in this case X∗U(k) is
minimized at k = 4
3
n. But meanwhile even when the merged entity keeps k = 4
3
n
brands, it is possible that the number of brands that other two competitors have
is not 4
3
n, because the merged entity may not distribute 2
3
n brands as divestitures
equally between firm 3 and firm 4.
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2.7 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we attempt to shed some light on merger policy with structural
remedies, a field of research which is in line with the practical trends of mergers in
recent 20 years but on which still there is very few theoretical literature. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper which tries to analyze one
popular merger trend in practice: mergers with structural divestitures of brands to
the existing competitor(s). In general, merger with remedies, as a powerful tool in
merger policy, increases the scope for profitable mergers because of the efficiency
gains from merger, meanwhile does not harm social welfare because of the merged
entity’s lessened market power, so the merger with remedies is both privately and
socially desirable. More precisely, the remedial offers must be larger when the
merger’s efficiency gains is smaller, which mirrors the proportionality principle
in remedy regulations. Another important result is that when goods are closer
to perfect substitutability, then the merging firms are more inclined to give some
brands to competitor(s), because the markup on each brand is lower. Therefore the
range of the efficiency gains which allows the merger with remedies to be approved
is larger. This paper provides theoretical suggestions to the antitrust authority
and shows that there is some room for the antitrust authority to improve social
welfare.
Except for the more general case we discussed in Section 2.6, there is some
scope for further research. For example, this paper models Phase I in the EU or
First Request in the US. However, as mentioned before, there is (small) portion of
merger cases which goes to Phase II or Second Request. As Farrell (2003) points
out, this second phase is characterized by a bargaining process between the merging
firms and the antitrust authority. We expect that some merger proposals, which
are blocked under the setting of this paper, could be cleared if further negotiations
are allowed between the merging firms and the antitrust authority.
2.8 Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 4. Based on the more general gross profit function 2.3, one
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can get the pre-merger firm’s gross profit as Πj =
∑jn
i=(j−1)n+1 [pi(q1, · · · , q3n)qi].
Plugging (2.2) into this profit function and maximizing it by choosing outputs
simultaneously, i.e., ∂Πj/∂qi = 0 yields the Cournot equilibrium quantity for each
brand qNM = (1 + µ) / [n(6 + 4µ)]. Plug qNM into (2.2), one can get the equilib-
rium price for each brand pNM = (3 + µ) / (6 + 4µ).
Each firm realizes the same profit ΠNM = npNMqNM = (1+µ)(3+µ)
(6+4µ)2
.
Following the utility function (2.1), the pre-merger equilibrium social welfare
is SWNM = UNM =
∑3n
i=1 qi − 3n2(1+µ)
[∑3n
i=1 q
2
i +
µ
3n
(∑3n
i=1 qi
)2]
= 3(1+µ)(9+5µ)
2(6+4µ)2
.
Combining terms yields the result in the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. When the divestiture to a competitor is exogenous, at
the stage (II) of the timing line, the antitrust authority approves the merger as
long as the post-merger social welfare is not smaller than the pre-merger one, i.e.
U(k) + X > UNM . Rewriting this condition yields X > UNM − U(k), which is
result of Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 4. Based on the more general gross profit function 2.3,
the two post-merger firms’ profits are
Πm =
k∑
i=(1
[pi(q1, · · · , q3n)qi] +X,
Πd =
3n∑
i=(k+1
[pi(q1, · · · , q3n)qi] ,
where m indicates the merged entity, d indicates the competitor which gets the
divestiture, i.e., firm 3. Using same procedure in Proof of Lemma 4, one can get
the equilibrium quantities in the post-merger market.
qm =
(1 + µ) [3n(2 + µ)− kµ]
3kµ2(3n− k) + 36n2(1 + µ) ,
qd =
(1 + µ)(6n+mµ)
3kµ2(3n− k) + 36n2(1 + µ) .
Pluging these two values into inverse demand function (2.2), the gross consumer
surplus function (2.1) and the firms’ profit functions showed above, at the end, we
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can get
X∗Π(k) =
1 + µ
18
[
9(3 + µ)
(3 + 2µ)2
− 2k(3n+ kµ)(kµ− 3n(2 + µ))
2
(k2µ2 − 3knµ2 − 12n2(1 + µ))2
]
,
X∗U(k) =
1
72
(1 + µ)(
27(9 + 5µ)
(3 + 2µ)2
− (4(8k4µ3 − 48k3nµ3 + 972n4(1 + µ)+
27kn3µ(8 + 19µ) + 9k2n2µ(−8 + µ(−19 + 8µ))))/(k2µ2 − 3knµ2 − 12n2(1 + µ))2).
As ∂X∗Π(k)/∂k < 0, ∂X
∗
U(k)/∂k < 0 when k ∈ (n, 32n] and ∂X∗U(k)/∂k > 0
when k ∈ [3
2
n, 2n], the curve X∗Π(k) and the curve X
∗
U(k) cross at most twice when
k ∈ (n, 2n]. We can avoid solving the maximization problem in a standard way,
and only compare the values of X∗Π(k) and X
∗
U(k) at three crucial points, k = n,
k = 3
2
n and k = 2n. Moreover, we can split the proof into 3 cases according to the
final results of mergers.
Case 1 When the results are either full merger or no merger.
According to Figure 2.2, one can get
X∗U(n) < X
∗
Π(n)
X∗U(
3
2
n) < X∗Π(
3
2
n),
X∗U(2n) 6 X∗Π(2n).
These three conditions cannot hold simultaneously because of the utility func-
tion we use and the conditions on the parameters, i.e., µ > 0, n > 2 and k ∈ (n, 2n].
Case 2 When the merger with remedies is feasible but the range of feasible k
is smaller than [3
2
n, 2n].
Originally there are two subcases showed in Figure 2.3, in the main text of the
paper we discuss them and reduce them into one case showed in Figure 2.5(a). So
based on the more strict range of k, we have
X∗U(
3
2
n) < X∗Π(
3
2
n),
X∗U(2n) > X
∗
Π(2n).
These two inequalities hold simultaneously as long as µ < µ1 ≡ (7 +
√
97)/2,
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meanwhile by X∗U(k) = X
∗
Π(k), we can get the benchmark
k˜ =
3n
2µ(72 + 51µ− µ2)×
(
√
5184 + 17280µ+ 19152µ2 + 8352µ3 + 1065µ4 − 54µ5 + µ6−
(72 + 24µ− 19µ2 + µ3)).
Case 3 When the merger with remedies is feasible and the range of feasible k
is [3
2
n, 2n].
Similarly with Case 2, using the reduced case showed in Figure 2.5(b), we have
X∗U(
3
2
n) > X∗Π(
3
2
n),
X∗U(2n) > X
∗
Π(2n).
These two inequalities hold simultaneously as long as µ > µ1.
Summarizing Case 1-3, one can get Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 6. When there are 4 pre-merger firms, the equilibrium pre-
merger outcomes are:
qNM =
1 + µ
n(8 + 5µ)
pNM =
4 + µ
8 + 5µ
ΠNM =
(1 + µ)(4 + µ)
(8 + 5µ)2
UNM =
12(1 + µ)(2 + µ)
(8 + 5µ)2
When only one competitor gets the divestiture from the merged entity, then
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the equilibrium outcomes are:
qm1 =
(1 + µ)(8 + µ)(8n− kµ+ 3nµ)
A
qd1 =
(1 + µ)(8 + µ)(8n+ kµ)
A
qc1 =
(1 + µ)(8 + µ)(8n− kµ+ 3nµ)
nA
Πk1 =
k(1 + µ)(8 + µ)2(4n+ kµ)(kµ− n(8 + 3µ))2
A2
where A = −4k2µ2(6 +µ) + 12knµ2(6 +µ) + 8n2(64 +µ(64 + 9µ)), qd1 indicates the
quantity produced by the competitor which gets the divestiture, and qc1 indicates
the quantity produced by the competitor which does not get.
When there are two competitor get the same divestitures from the merged
entity, then the equilibrium outcomes are:
qm2 =
(1 + µ)(4n(4 + µ)− kµ)
2C
qd2 =
(1 + µ)(8n+ kµ)
C
Πk2 = (k
2µ(−1 + µ(−3 + 2(−1 + 8n)µ))− 16n2(−4 + µ(−9− 5µ+ 8n(4 + 3µ)))+
16kn(1 + µ(3 + µ(3 + µ− 2n(1 + 2µ)))))/(2(1 + µ)C)
∂Πk1/∂k > 0 and ∂Π
k
2/∂k > 0, so using the same method as before, we avoid
solving the general inequality, but only compare their values at k = n and k = 2n.
Solving the pair of inequalities Πn1 > Πn2 and Π2n1 > Π2n2 , we have µ > µ¯(n).
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Asymmetric price adjustments: A
supply side approach
This chapter is based on Antoniou, Fiocco and Guo (2015).
3.1 Introduction
A common observation in several markets is that retail prices react asymmetrically
over time in response to changes in the input prices. In particular, if the input price
tends to increase, the price for the final commodity reacts immediately. However,
if the input price falls, the adjustment of the retail price is slower. A well-known
example that corroborates this observation is the gasoline market.1
The economic literature provides systematic empirical support for the phe-
nomenon of asymmetric price adjustments, which is also known as rockets and
feathers (e.g., Asplund et al. 2000; Bacon 1991; Blair and Rezek 2008; Boren-
stein et al. 1997; Chen et al. 2008; Deltas 2008; Green et al. 2010; Hannan and
Berger 1991; Peltzman 2000; Valadkhani 2013; Verlinda 2008). Peltzman (2000,
p. 466) emphasizes that “output prices tend to respond faster to input increases
than to decreases. This tendency is found in more than two of every three markets
examined.”
Asymmetric price adjustments have been repeatedly associated with the collu-
1Other examples can be found in the coffee, corn and banking industries.
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sive behavior of firms. For instance, gasoline markets can be inclined to collusion
since outputs and prices are easily observable by everyone. However, as Peltzman
(2000) points out, the pattern of rockets and feathers is equally likely to be found
in concentrated and atomistic markets. Recently, a relevant strand of literature
has focused on the idea that consumers are imperfectly informed about market
prices and a fraction of them face positive search costs. Prices respond asymmet-
rically since consumers cannot observe current production costs and their demand
is sensitive to previous cost realizations.2
In this chapter we attempt to shed new light on asymmetric price adjustments
in a standard competitive environment where firms provide a homogeneous good
and compete in prices, abstracting from market imperfections such as collusion
and limited information. The traditional economic theory suggests that firms earn
zero profits and prices react symmetrically to cost shocks. Focusing on the supply
side, we show that the nature of this result changes drastically if the opportunity
of profitable storing is allowed.
A motivating example for our setting is the well-known shock that affected the
US gasoline market in 2005 due to the hurricanes Katrina and Rita. According to
the detailed investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), gas stations
were selling gasoline in their tanks at significantly higher prices than actual costs
and some of them earned substantial profits. The FTC found no evidence of
collusion and concluded that the conduct of firms in response to the supply shocks
caused by the hurricanes was consistent with competition (see FTC 2006).
We develop a two-period model where two firms sell a homogeneous good and
engage in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth competition by simultaneously setting
prices and then ordering the desired quantities from their provider. A shock occurs
in the economy, which makes the first period input (wholesale) costs diverge from
the second period costs. In each period a firm can order a quantity up to a level
that enables it to cover the whole market. Even though the possibility of price
undercutting could drive prices to marginal costs, we find as a unique prediction
of the game that a storage capacity leads to a prompt increase in prices above
marginal costs when firms anticipate that the future input costs will be higher than
the current costs. This is the case when storing for the next period is profitable,
2We refer to Section 3.2 for a review of the relevant literature.
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namely, when the discount factor is relatively high. The unique equilibrium price
reflects the next period marginal cost, weighted by the discount factor.
The rationale behind this result is that profitable storing induces a firm to
fill its depository, irrespective of what the rival does. A firm that prices at the
discounted future input cost is indifferent between selling today or tomorrow and
can store the purchased quantity if the rival undercuts its price and serves the
market today. When input costs are expected to increase tomorrow, despite the
scope for price undercutting the firms can coordinate on higher current prices than
marginal costs. As a result, competition is relaxed and firms make positive profits.
It is worth emphasizing that a firm’s commitment to increase its price in antici-
pation of higher input costs is credible as long as storing is profitable. When future
discounting is relatively low and storing is unprofitable, the firms’ incentives for
price undercutting drive the price to the current marginal cost and the standard
Bertrand outcome is restored. Consequently, prices adjust only after an increase
in the input costs materializes, and the firms make zero profits.
In the same vein, when a shock is expected to decrease the input costs, storing
for the next period is unprofitable and it does not serve as a commitment device.
A price higher than marginal costs would drive a firm out of the market, while
a price below marginal costs would entail losses. The firms are trapped in the
Bertrand paradox and adjust their prices only after a cost change materializes,
which yields zero profits. The opportunity of profitable storing implies that the
immediate price adjustment to an input cost shock is more pronounced when the
shock is positive than when it is negative. Hence, our results provide theoretical
support for the phenomenon of rockets and feathers.
The driving force of our results persists in different alternative scenarios. For
instance, in the baseline model we assume that the input supply is perfectly elas-
tic and the firms cannot affect the input costs. However, in practice, input costs
may also depend on the firms’ demand. In a setting where input costs partially
change already in the first period since the firms’ higher than usual demand can
only be covered at the new input cost, we find that our qualitative results remain
unaffected. Storing drives asymmetric pricing even under alternative market struc-
tures, such as monopoly or Cournot competition.3 Therefore, our results provide
3We refer to Section 3.7 for a discussion on the robustness of our results.
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new insights into the phenomenon of asymmetric pricing which lend themselves to
a validation from the empirical or experimental literature.
3.2 Related literature
The phenomenon of asymmetric price adjustments has been explored in the eco-
nomic literature which provides alternative explanations. Using panel data on US
sales volume and prices of gasoline, Borestein and Shepard (1996) find evidence
that the gasoline market is characterized by asymmetric price patterns and the
firms’ behavior is consistent with tacit collusion. A more recent strand of lit-
erature focuses on competitive environments, where consumers cannot perfectly
observe market prices and search is costly. The main contributions differ in the
driving force of asymmetric price adjustments and in the empirical predictions.
Tappata (2009) considers a non-sequential search model with symmetric learning,
while Yang and Ye (2008) provide an explanation for asymmetric pricing based
on asymmetric learning by consumers. Arguing that previous work is not able to
capture the specific patterns of price adjustments and of consumer search observed
in retail gasoline markets, Lewis (2011) develops a search model which assumes
that consumers’ price expectations are based on prices observed during previous
purchases. Cabral and Fishman (2012) investigate asymmetric price adjustments
in a model where agents are inattentive to new information most of the time and
only update their information at pre-specified intervals. As discussed in the in-
troduction, our paper attempts to provide novel insights into the well-established
phenomenon of asymmetric pricing, focusing on the supply side in a standard
model that abstracts from market imperfections, such as collusion or limited in-
formation, and from behavioral aspects regarding the consumers.
Our analysis is also related to the literature on the role of inventories in the
decisions of a firm. Particular attention has been devoted to the importance of
inventory adjustments as a means to smooth the effects of shocks over time (e.g.,
Amihud and Mendelson 1983; Borenstein and Shepard 2002; Reagan 1982; Reagan
and Weitzman 1982). In this paper, we emphasize the role of inventories as a driver
of the asymmetric price response to input cost shocks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.3 describes the retail
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gasoline market in the US, whose main features are in line with our setting. Section
3.4 sets out the formal model. Section 3.5 derives the main results. Section 3.6
extends our model. Section 3.7 discusses the robustness of our results. Section 3.8
concludes. All formal proofs are collected in the Appendix.
3.3 The US retail gasoline market
Although we do not aim at explicitly modeling the retail gasoline market, our
setting reflects some relevant features of this market. In the US an estimated
80% of fuel is currently sold by relatively small retail outlets and their dominance
continues to grow. The majority of these firms are single-store operators – more
than 70,000 stores across the country. Half of the retail outlets sell fuel under the
brand of a refining company, but virtually all of them are operated by independent
entrepreneurs. The remaining half sell unbranded fuel, which is purchased on the
open market or via unbranded contracts with a refiner or distributor. A station
usually obtains gasoline either directly at a terminal price known as the “rack”
price or through an intermediate supplier called a “jobber” which typically charges
a competitive margin over the rack price.4
Retail gasoline prices are publicly observable and in some states (e.g., New
Jersey and Wisconsin) consumer protection laws require that posted gasoline prices
remain in effect at least for a given period, generally 24 hours. Since gasoline
evaporates rather quickly, carrying large quantities is suboptimal. Moreover, the
size of tanks in gas stations is limited by physical constraints. The report of the
economist Keith Leffler (2007, p. 33), which investigates the factors that influence
regional gas prices throughout the state of Washington, states that “the inventory
philosophy of producers is ‘just in time’ to have adequate supplies to meet expected
demand. Only two to five days of finished product is available to bridge short-term
supply interruptions.”
When setting the prices and ordering the quantities from their providers, the
retailers generally face the rack price (plus a competitive distribution margin) as
4The interested reader is referred to the NACS Retail Fuels Report of the Association for
Convenience and Fuel Retailing available at www.nacsonline.com/YourBusiness/FuelsReports/
Pages/default.aspx.
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a marginal cost. If unexpected events occur which affect the import or refining
stage (say, a conflict in an oil-producing country or a hurricane), rack prices may
increase immediately and, more relevantly, they are expected to rise even more in
the near future due to possible supply shortages. In particular, as described in the
NACS Retail Fuels Report of the Association for Convenience and Fuel Retailing
(2013, p. 63), “when disruptions occur, retailers [...] are susceptible to changes in
product availability and volatile wholesale prices. Branded fuel retailers may incur
price increases and be put on volume allocations. Meanwhile, unbranded retailers
may experience more dramatic wholesale price increases, since they must compete
for limited supply on the spot market, or be denied access to supplies completely.”
3.4 The model
Setting We consider two symmetric firms i = 1, 2 that provide a homogeneous
good and engage in repeated Bertrand-Edgeworth competition by simultaneously
deciding on their prices and then on their output levels, which is known in the
literature as production to order (e.g., Chowdhury 2005; Dixon 1984; Maskin
1986). As discussed in section 7, our qualitative results go through when prices
and quantities are set simultaneously.5 In each period τ = 1, 2, firm i sets a price
pτi for the good and then orders a quantity qτi from its provider. We denote by
qmτi the quantity that firm i places on the market in period τ . Since we aim at
analyzing short-term events, we assume that market demand is inelastic and in
each period consumers purchase a quantity d > 0 irrespective of the price level.6
Following the relevant literature (see Chowdhury 2005 and the references cited
5We refer to Allen and Hellwig (1986), Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Dixon (1984) and Maskin
(1986) for an analysis of equilibrium existence in Bertrand-Edgeworth models. More recently,
Chowdhury (2009) investigates a model of Bertrand competition in the presence of non-rigid
capacity constraints.
6Inelastic demand seems to be a reasonable assumption in the gasoline retail market, where
consumer demand is largely unresponsive to changes in prices at least in the short run. In section
7 we argue that our qualitative results go through with more general demand functions.
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therein), the residual demand for firm i is given by
Rτi(pτi, pτj, q
m
τj) =

d− qmτj if pτi > pτj
max
{
d
2
, d− qmτj
}
if pτi = pτj
d if pτi < pτj.
(3.1)
The residual demand in (3.1) is distributed according to the efficient rationing
rule. As long as the demand is inelastic, this formulation captures any combined
rationing rule, including the proportional rationing rule (e.g., Tasna´di 1999). The
second line of equation (3.1) identifies the tie-breaking rule that is used, among
others, in Davidson and Deneckere (1986) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). This
formulation exhibits the attractive feature that it allows for the spillover of the
uncovered residual demand from one firm to another.7
The quantity qτi that firm i orders in each period cannot exceed d, which
represents the firm’s storage capacity.8 This assumption is reasonable in markets
where storing large quantities is unfeasible. For instance, as argued in section 3,
gasoline evaporates quite quickly and the size of tanks in gas stations is limited by
physical constraints. In section 7 we show that our qualitative results carry over
with alternative storage capacities. Notably, a storage capacity equal to d allows
each firm to serve the whole market, and the possibility of price undercutting could
drive prices to marginal costs.
Each period τ firm i may store (a part of) the ordered quantity qτi for the next
period. Let qrτi be the quantity that firm i stores in period τ for the period τ + 1,
namely, firm i’s reserves. The firms incur a constant cost cτ per unit of input (e.g.,
the rack price for gasoline) in period τ .
Firm i’s profits in period τ are given by
piτi = pτi min q
m
τi, Rτi(pτi, pτj, q
m
τj)− cτqτi, τ, i = 1, 2,
which represents the difference between total revenues and total costs. Total rev-
enues depend on the quantity sold on the market. Since we allow for voluntary
7Our results carry over with alternative tie-breaking rules, such as Rτi = d
qmτi
qmτi+q
m
τj
(for qmτi +
qmτj = 0, this tie-breaking rule becomes Rτi =
d
2 ).
8We assume that storage is costless. Introducing a positive cost of storage does not alter our
qualitative results.
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trading, this quantity is the minimum between the quantity that the firm puts on
the market and the firm’s residual demand in (3.1).9 The firm’s total costs depend
on the quantity ordered.
Firm i’s aggregate profits can be written as
pii = pi1i + δpi2i,
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the discount factor on the second period.
Input cost shock As discussed in the introduction, our purpose is to investigate
a situation where a shock occurs in the input market which makes the current input
costs diverge from the future costs. If the shock is positive, input costs tend to
increase, i.e., c2 > c1. This is typically the case after extreme weather phenomena
or the exacerbation of political instability in an oil-producing country, which can
lead to supply disruptions. If the shock is negative, such as the sudden end of a
conflict in an oil-producing country or the announcement of the US Department
of Energy that the strategic oil inventories have increased, then input costs tend
to decrease, i.e., c2 < c1. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that input costs
vary in a deterministic way, but our results carry over even with cost uncertainty
as long as the firms expect that future costs will depart from current costs.
In the baseline model we suppose that the input supply is perfectly elastic
in every period. Since in practice retailers may affect input prices through their
demand, in section 6 we consider a situation where input costs partially change
already in the first period since the retailers’ higher than usual demand can only
be satisfied at the new input cost.
Timing and equilibrium concept The timing of the model unfolds as follows.
First period
(I) Cost c1 is realized.
(II) The firms simultaneously set their prices.
9Nothing substantial would change if the firms must fully cover the consumer demand.
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(III) The firms simultaneously order the quantities that are sold on the market or
stored in the depository for the next period.
Second period
(IV) Cost c2 is realized.
(V) The first period competition stages (II) and (III) are repeated.
The equilibrium concept we adopt is the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
(SPNE).10 Moving backwards, we first derive the equilibrium prices and quantities
in the second period. Afterwards, we determine the first period outcome of the
game and derive the corresponding equilibrium prices and quantities.
3.5 Main results
3.5.1 Second period equilibrium
The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium prices and quantities in the
second period.
Lemma 7 A. If
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i 6 d, the outcome (p∗2i, qm∗2i , qr∗2i ) constitutes an equilib-
rium of the second period continuation game if and only if p∗2i = c2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
2i 6 d
and qr∗2i = 0, i = 1, 2.
B. If
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i > d, the outcome (p
∗
2i, q
m∗
2i , q
r∗
2i ) constitutes an equilibrium of the
second period continuation game if and only if p∗2i ∈ [p∗2, p∗2] ⊆ [0, c2],
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
2i = d
and qr∗2i = max 0, q
r∗
1i − qm∗2i , i = 1, 2.
Lemma 7A indicates that, if the total amount of reserves from the first period
does not exceed the demand d, the equilibrium price in the second period reflects
the current marginal cost c2. This holds true even though the cost of reserves was
incurred in the first period and it is therefore zero in the second period. A price
higher than the marginal cost clearly drives a firm out of the market. No firm has
an incentive to set a price below the marginal cost, since it cannot undercut the
10In line with the main literature we allow for mixed strategies but look for SPNE without
mixing on the equilibrium path.
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rival’s price and profitably sell more than its reserves. Moreover, since we allow
for voluntary trading, in equilibrium a part of the market may remain uncovered,
yet the reserves are fully exhausted.
As Lemma 7B reveals, things are different when the aggregate reserves are
greater than the demand. Since the market cannot absorb all the reserves and
their cost was sunk in the first period, a price war takes place between the firms as
they try to sell their reserves. Following Levitan and Shubik (1972) and Osborne
and Pitchik (1986), there exists a (generally unique) mixed strategy equilibrium
where firms randomize in prices within the interval [p∗
2
, p∗2] ⊆ [0, c2]. Any price
above c2 cannot be set with positive probability, since the standard undercutting
rationale applies. Contrary to the case where the total amount of reserves does not
exceed the demand, choosing with probability 1 a price equal to the marginal cost
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium, since each firm has an incentive to undercut
the rival and sell off all its reserves. The lower bound of the price interval crucially
depends on the amount of reserves. If either firm does not carry full reserves, i.e.,∑2
i=1 q
r
1i ∈ (d, 2d), the minimum price is strictly above zero since (at least) the firm
with lower reserves cannot serve the whole market, which mitigates the incentives
to undercut. Only if both firms carry full reserves, i.e., qr1i = d, i = 1, 2, can each
firm undercut the rival and serve the whole market, which drives the price to zero.
The market demand is always satisfied through the reserves.
An implication of Lemma 7, which is useful throughout the rest of the analysis,
is that the second period equilibrium price can never exceed the current input cost
c2, irrespective of what occurred in the first period.
3.5.2 No shock
For illustrative purposes we first consider the benchmark case where no shock
occurs, i.e., c1 = c2 ≡ c. This translates into a dynamic version of the one-period
game described in Chowdhury (2005) where we introduce the storing option.
The following remark summarizes the equilibrium of the game in the absence
of a shock.
Remark 2 Suppose c1 = c2 ≡ c. Then, the outcome (p∗τi, qm∗τi , qr∗τi ) constitutes a
SPNE if and only if p∗τi = c and
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d, τ, i = 1, 2. If δ < 1, then qr∗τi = 0,
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τ, i = 1, 2. If δ = 1, then
∑2
i=1 q
r∗
1i 6 d and qr∗2i = 0, i = 1, 2.
The opportunity of storing some quantity for the next period does not alter
the outcome of the static game. The firms set a price equal to the marginal cost
in each period and earn zero profits. If δ < 1, storing is clearly profit detrimental,
since the marginal cost c is higher than the second period discounted price (which
is bounded above at δc, according to Lemma 7). If δ = 1, storing is at best not
harmful and the firms cannot improve their profits. Therefore, in equilibrium the
firms are indifferent to storing or not provided that the total amount of reserves
does not exceed the demand. Otherwise, the second period price would fall below
c and storing would be detrimental.
3.5.3 Positive shock
For the sake of convenience, we split our analysis according to the direction of the
shock in the input market. We first investigate the case of a positive shock where
input costs tend to increase, i.e., c2 > c1. Intuitively, a positive shock creates an
incentive to purchase at a cost c1 a quantity that is higher than usual. We know
from Lemma 7 that, if the aggregate stored quantity from the first period does
not exceed the demand, the second period price will be equal to the new marginal
cost c2. This gives the firms the opportunity to sell at a positive margin.
The following proposition describes the equilibrium of the game in the presence
of a positive shock.
Proposition 5 Suppose c2 > c1.
A. If δ > c1
c2
, the outcome (p∗τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a SPNE if and only if
p∗1i = δp
∗
2i = δc2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi = d, q
r∗
1i = d− qm∗1i and qr∗2i = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
B. If δ < c1
c2
, the outcome (p∗τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a SPNE if and only if
p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 5A considers the case where the discount factor δ is relatively high
so that purchasing one unit of the commodity at c1 in the first period and selling
it at c2 in the second period is profitable. Anticipating higher future input costs,
the firms immediately adjust their prices at the discounted second period input
cost δc2. In order to substantiate the intuition behind this result as provided
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in the introduction, it is important to realize that for δ > c1
c2
each firm has an
incentive to purchase a quantity d in the first period, which can be partially stored
and profitably sold in the second period. It follows from Lemma 7 that, if the
aggregate reserves do not exceed the demand, a firm that adjusts its price at δc2
is indifferent between serving the market today or tomorrow. Therefore, it can
credibly commit to purchase d even if the rival undercuts its price. In particular,
if the undercutting firm prefers to (partially) serve the market today, the non-
deviating firm can store (a portion of) d and sell it tomorrow at c2. Any deviation
above δc2 is unprofitable as long as the firm conjectures that the rival will cover
the whole market.
As described in Remark 2, in the absence of a shock each firm cannot cred-
ibly commit not to be aggressive vis-a`-vis the rival, and the standard Bertrand
rationale applies. When input costs are expected to increase tomorrow, profitable
storage acts as a commitment device to increase prices already today, which re-
laxes competition. The firms can coordinate to increase prices above marginal
costs and earn positive profits. Notably, Proposition 5A shows that the price at
the discounted second period input cost is the unique equilibrium of the game. 11
Although the market can be split between firms in several manners (the symmetric
equilibrium qm∗τi =
d
2
, τ, i = 1, 2, is only one possibility among others), the market
is fully covered in both periods because each firm orders and sells d.
Since we aim at analyzing short-term events, we expect that the discount factor
will be relatively high and the outcome of Proposition 5A is the most relevant
for our purposes. Proposition 5B describes what happens if the firm’s future
discounting is low enough, i.e., δ < c1
c2
. The rationale for this result is immediate
in light of our previous discussion. Since storing is not profitable and cannot be
used as a commitment device to relax competition, the firms are trapped in the
Bertrand paradox and set their prices at the current marginal costs, which yield
zero profits.
11We refer to the proof of Proposition 1 in the Appendix for technical details.
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3.5.4 Negative shock
We now turn to the case of a negative shock where input costs tend to decrease,
i.e., c2 < c1. The following proposition summarizes the main results.
Proposition 6 Suppose c2 < c1. Then, the outcome (p
∗
τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a
SPNE if and only if p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 6 replicates the outcome in Proposition 5B. When a shock is ex-
pected to reduce the input costs, storing is clearly unprofitable and firms cannot
coordinate on prices higher than marginal costs. Moreover, any price below the
current costs would entail non-positive profits. As a consequence, the price in
each period reflects the current marginal cost and the standard Bertrand rationale
applies.
It is worth noting that in our model the role of storing depends on the discount
factor but it can be also viewed as a function of the magnitude of the shock in the
input market for a given discount. An alternative interpretation of our results is
that, if the magnitude of the shock is large enough (i.e., if c2 is sufficiently higher
than c1), storing is profitable and the firms adjust their prices to the cost shock
faster than when the shock is relatively small or even negative. The driving force of
our results is the opportunity of profitable storing and, as it emerges from sections
3.6 and 3.7, the model is robust to perturbations of the initial assumptions in
different directions, as long as storing is relevant.
3.5.5 Empirical implications
We are now in a position to relate our results to the empirical predictions. In
order to derive the price-cost pass-through rates over time, we introduce a pre-
shock period, called period 0, where the input cost is the same as in the first
period, i.e., c0 = c1.
12 Moreover, we assume that in period 0 the price reflects the
current marginal cost, p0 = c0.
13 Using the results in Propositions 5 and 6, the
12The results remain qualitatively unaffected if the input shock also alters the cost already in
the first period, i.e., c0 6= c1.
13In other terms, before the shock we are in the long-run equilibrium. This is a reasonable
assumption when the future shock is unexpected, so that the firms cannot react in period 0. Any
other price-cost relationship in period 0 that differs from marginal cost pricing does not alter
our qualitative conclusions.
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(a) Positive shock and high discount factor
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Figure 3.1: Price adjustments
percentage variations in prices following a shock are
β̂+0 =
δc2 − c1
c1
, β̂+1 =
1− δ
δ
, β̂−0 = 0, and β̂
−
1 =
c1 − c2
c1
, (3.2)
where β̂+0 and β̂
+
1 respectively denote the percentage variations in prices between
periods 0 and 1 and between periods 1 and 2 due to a positive input shock (for
δ > c1
c2
). The interpretation of β̂−0 and β̂
−
1 follows similarly in case of a negative
shock. A comparison between β̂+0 and β̂
−
0 immediately reveals that β̂
+
0 > β̂
−
0
for δ > c1
c2
, namely, final prices rise faster when input costs increase than when
they fall if storing is profitable. In particular, β̂−0 = 0 indicates an initial price
stickiness with a negative shock. The speed of later adjustment is reversed, namely,
β̂+1 <
∣∣∣β̂−1 ∣∣∣. This is in line with the main empirical literature (e.g., Borestein et al.
1997; Chesnes 2012), which shows that retail prices initially react faster when the
input shock is positive but the opposite occurs when the total adjustment is near
completion.
It is also worth noting from (3.2) that, unless δ = 1, the price adjustment in
case of a positive shock unravels gradually. In particular, we have β̂+1 > β̂
+
0 if
δ > ( c1
c2
)
1
2 . Put differently, when the discount factor is relatively high, the relative
increase in prices is more pronounced in the first than in the second period. This
is consistent with the empirical evidence that the price-cost pass-through declines
over time with a positive shock.
Our results are depicted for illustrative purposes in Figure 3.1, where panel (a)
shows the price adjustment over time in the presence of a positive shock and panel
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(b) indicates the price adjustment with a negative shock.
To investigate the empirical implications of our results, it is also helpful to
translate them in terms of empirical models. Our predictions can be estimated via
a dynamic model of the following form
∆pτ =
∑n+
i=0
β+i ∆c
+
τ+k−i +
∑n−
i=0
β−i ∆c
−
τ+k−i + ετ . (3.3)
Equation (3.3) reflects the idea that the spread in retail prices ∆pτ between periods
τ − 1 and τ depends on positive and negative cost changes ∆c+τ+k−i and ∆c−τ+k−i
at possibly different rates β+i and β
−
i , plus an error term ετ .
14 The term k >
0 captures the impact of anticipated future cost changes on the current price
change. For k = 0 the econometric model in (3.3) is fairly standard in the empirical
literature (e.g., Borenstein et al. 1997; Chesnes 2012). Positive values of k indicate
that an anticipated cost change between periods τ + k − 1 and τ + k can affect
the price change already k periods earlier. This is a key message of our paper for
the empirical studies. The predictions of our model suggest that in markets with
storing opportunities the anticipation of future cost changes is a relevant driver
for asymmetric pricing.
Our aim is to derive the estimated β+i and β
−
i in (3.3) that our model generates.
The phenomenon of rockets and feathers occurs if β+i > β
−
i for at least one lag
i. We first consider the case of a positive shock, c2 > c1, and a relatively high
discount factor, δ > c1
c2
. Since in our stylized two-period model only the costs in
the next period can be anticipated, i.e., k = 1, plugging our results into (3.3) and
neglecting the error term ετ yields after some manipulation
p1 − p0 = δc2 − c1 = β+0 (c2 − c1)
p2 − p1 = c2 − δc2 = β+1 (c2 − c1).
This implies β+0 =
δc2−c1
c2−c1 and β
+
1 =
c2−δc2
c2−c1 . When the shock is negative, we find
p1 − p0 = 0 = β−0 (c2 − c1)
14Equation (3.3) may also include an error correction term that accounts for deviations from
the long-run equilibrium. Neglecting this term does not affect our results qualitatively.
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p2 − p1 = c2 − c1 = β−1 (c2 − c1),
which yields β−0 = 0 and β
−
1 = 1. The predictions of our model reveal the existence
of asymmetric pricing. We find for δ > c1
c2
that β+0 > β
−
0 = 0, namely, the
immediate price adjustment is larger with a positive shock than with a negative
shock when storing is profitable, and the negative shock is associated with a price
stickiness. The speed of later adjustment is reversed, β+1 < β
−
1 . Moreover, we have∑n+
i=0 β
+
i =
∑n−
i=0 β
−
i , which is consistent with the empirical evidence that in most
markets the wholesale and retail prices do not tend to diverge over time.
3.6 Endogenous input cost
The results derived so far are based on the assumption that in each period the
input supply is perfectly elastic. Put differently, each firm could potentially order
infinite quantities at the current input costs. In reality, however, the change in
the firms’ demand due to a shock may affect the input costs. To investigate this
case, we now assume that in the first period the (common) provider can obtain
a quantity up to d (which represents the ‘historical’ quantity, i.e., the quantity
in the absence of a shock) at a cost c1, for instance, due to long-term contracts.
If the provider wants to acquire larger quantities to serve the firms’ demand, it
must resort to other sources (say, the spot market) and pay the new input cost c2
on the additional amount already in the first period. The provider’s average cost
function exhibits a kink at d, and the price charged by the provider now depends
on the firms’ demand for the input.
An endogenous input cost complicates the analysis, since it creates an interde-
pendence between the firms’ costs. Nonetheless, as this reflects economic realities
to some extent, an investigation of such a case is warranted in order to check the
robustness of the results presented in the previous section.
In light of this discussion, the average input cost in the first period is given by
c˜1 =
c1 min d,
∑2
i=1 q1i + c2 max 0,
∑2
i=1 q1i − d∑2
i=1 q1i
. (3.4)
We assume that the provider sets an input price equal to the average cost in
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(3.4) plus a fixed markup (normalized to zero). This input price rule captures in
a simple but effective manner the idea that the firms’ demand affects the input
price, abstracting from the mode of competition in the upstream market. When
the firms’ demand does not exceed d, the provider does not need to purchase any
quantity from additional sources and therefore the first period input cost is c1.
If, however, the firms’ demand is higher than d, the provider must acquire any
additional quantity at c2, which increases (decreases) the average cost in (3.4) if
c2 > (<)c1 and affects in the same direction the input cost incurred by the firms.
3.6.1 Positive shock
The following proposition considers the case of a positive shock.
Proposition 7 Suppose c2 > c1.
A. If δ > 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
), the outcome (p∗τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a SPNE if and only
if p∗1i = δp
∗
2i = δc2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi = d, q
r∗
1i = d− qm∗1i and qr∗2i = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
B. If c1
c2
6 δ < 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
), no equilibrium exists.
C. If δ < c1
c2
, the outcome (p∗τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a SPNE if and only if
p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 7A indicates that, if the discount factor is sufficiently high, i.e.,
δ > 1
4
(3+ c1
c2
), the equilibrium price in the first period equals the discounted second
period marginal cost δc2 and reaches c2 in the second period, which ensures that
each firm is indifferent to selling across the two periods. The critical value of the
discount factor, 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
), corresponds to the threshold above which each firm
orders d in the first period and the demand is fully covered in each period. The
intuition for this result falls across the same lines as in Proposition 5A. It is worth
mentioning that the critical threshold of the discount factor is higher than in the
baseline model, i.e., 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
) > c1
c2
. The idea is that now storing increases the
firms’ unit costs already in the first period, which strengthens the condition under
which each firm finds it optimal to order d in the first period.
Another dimension introduced by an endogenous input cost is the indetermi-
nacy for an intermediate range of values for the discount factor, i.e., c1
c2
6 δ <
1
4
(3 + c1
c2
). As Proposition 7B reveals, in this case no equilibrium exists (in pure
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or in mixed strategies). To fix ideas, consider the equilibrium prices described
in Proposition 7A. At these prices, since for intermediate values of the discount
factor storing is still profitable but to a lower extent than in the previous case, the
quantity equilibrium involves orders lower than d in the first period. Following a
price increase of the rival, the non-deviating firm still does not want to order d and
serve the whole market. This implies that a firm can (infinitely) raise its price in
the first period and serve the uncovered part of the market. This conclusion differs
from the result in the baseline model, where each firm has an incentive to order
d in the first period for δ > c1
c2
irrespective of what the rival does, which prevents
any profitable deviation. The reason is that storing now increases the firms’ unit
costs already in the first period, which makes storing less attractive.
Following a loose dynamic argument, as long as the first period prices are
higher than δc2, each firm has an incentive to undercut the rival’s price in order
to sell in the first period. Moreover, any price below δc2 cannot be supported as
an equilibrium, since the non-deviating firm would prefer to sell in the next period
while the rival could increase the price and sell profitably in the first period.
Hence, for c1
c2
6 δ < 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
), there is no equilibrium in the price setting game
and therefore no SPNE exists. 15
Proposition 7C predicts that, if the discount factor is low enough, i.e., δ < c1
c2
,
storing is unprofitable and no firm has an incentive to order any quantity for the
next period irrespective of what the rival does, since this would result in a net
loss. Therefore, prices adjust to the current input costs as in Proposition 5B and
the standard Bertrand argument applies in each period of the game.
15The indeterminacy arises in our model mainly because of the inelastic demand. This problem
can be removed if a chock price is introduced above which the demand is zero or alternatively
if we allow for a negatively sloped demand function (which is not considered here for the sake
of tractability). Following Dixon (1984) and Maskin (1986), in either case a mixed strategy
equilibrium exists. Interestingly, the equilibrium involves a set of prices higher than δc2 in the
first period. No firm has an incentive to set a price lower than δc2 since it could sell in the second
period and obtain the same profits. However, it follows from the previous discussion that a firm
recognizes that it can increase the price in the first period because the rival’s inability to commit
to order d implies that a part of the market will remain uncovered. This yields an upper bound
of the price range at the monopoly price on the residual demand. Therefore, the price response
to the input cost shock can be even more severe than with higher future discounting.
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3.6.2 Negative shock
The following proposition describes what happens in the case of a negative shock.
Proposition 8 Suppose c2 < c1. Then, the outcome (p
∗
τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ) constitutes a
SPNE if and only if p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 8 replicates the outcome of Proposition 6. As in the baseline model,
storing is unprofitable since the first period cost c˜1 is higher than the second period
cost c2. However, deriving the equilibrium is now more demanding as c˜1 might be
lower than c1 in equilibrium. This would be the case if the aggregate orders in
the first period are higher than d. Things become more complicated since it is not
straightforward to see whether price undercutting below c1 in the first period is
profitable or not. Indeed, it turns out to be unprofitable since the non-deviating
firm does not order any positive quantity (which cannot be sold in the first period)
and therefore the undercutting firm does not benefit from a reduction in the input
costs. In equilibrium, the price is equal to c1 in the first period and to c2 in the
second period. Since we allow for voluntary trading, a part of the demand may
remain uncovered.
Notably, we can exclude the existence of other equilibria. In particular, prices
above c1 in the first period cannot be supported as an equilibrium because of the
usual Bertrand argument. Any equilibrium cannot sustain prices below c1 since a
firm has an incentive to deviate upward in the first period and set a price above
c1. An interesting feature of the quantity setting game following this deviation is
that it does not exhibit any equilibrium in pure strategies. The firm with the price
below c1 strictly prefers to order either zero or d to any other strategy. However,
this firm cannot order zero with probability 1 in equilibrium, since the rival would
purchase d, which induces the firm to deviate by ordering a positive quantity as
the input cost c˜1 declines. Moreover, the firm cannot order d with probability 1 in
equilibrium, otherwise the rival would purchase zero and the associated cost c˜1 = c1
would entail losses. The quantity setting game resembles a game of matching
pennies, and it turns out that the firm with the price above c1 sells some quantity
at a positive margin while the firm with the price below c1 mixes between ordering
zero and d so that it earns zero (expected) profits and the market is fully covered.
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3.7 Robustness
3.7.1 Mode of competition
In our model the firms set prices and then decide on quantities, which is known
in the literature as production to order. The case in which prices and quantities
are determined simultaneously also deserves some attention. The main technical
problem identified in a simple static framework by Chowdhury (2005) is the nonex-
istence of pure strategy equilibria. Under some mild conditions (such as a finite
price at which profits are maximized), Allen and Hellwig (1986) and Dasgupta and
Maskin (1986) establish the general existence of an equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Since in our framework the strategic role of profitable storage does not crucially
depend on the observability of the rivals’ prices, we expect that our results will
carry over in this scenario, although the derivation of equilibria would be more
cumbersome. The case of a negative shock does not add any element of interest to
the analysis, since storing is unprofitable and the equilibrium of the static game
persists.
It is also worth exploring whether the strategic role of storing as an explanation
for asymmetric pricing emerges even in a monopolistic setting or under alternative
competitive structures such as Cournot competition. Indeed, we can show that
storing affects the pricing strategy of a monopolist in several possible manners.
Similar results hold when firms compete in Cournot fashion.16 To make the prob-
lem interesting, consider a standard downward sloping demand function. When
the shock is negative, storing is unprofitable and the monopoly price equalizes cur-
rent marginal revenues and the current (constant) marginal costs in each period.
When the shock is positive and storing is profitable, δ > c1
c2
, the monopolist’s pric-
ing strategy depends on the size of the storage capacity. If the capacity is so large
that the firm can cover the demand in two periods, the price in the first period still
equalizes current marginal revenues and current marginal costs, while the price in
the second period equalizes the discounted marginal revenues and the first period
marginal costs. This implies that in the first period the price adjustment follows
the same pattern as with a negative shock, but the second period price adjustment
16All our claims can be proved formally. Computations are available upon request.
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is smaller. When the storage capacity is tight, the monopolist faces a trade-off be-
tween selling the quantity in the first period or storing it for the second period.
In this case the firm prefers to increase the price in the first period in order to
reduce its current sales and store more output for the next period. Specifically,
if the size of the storage capacity is very small (below a certain threshold level),
the monopolist will also produce (or purchase from its distributor) in the second
period and the level of prices in the two periods cannot be unambiguously ranked.
Interestingly, the price may even decrease in the second period despite the increase
in the input costs. If the capacity is relatively less stringent (above the thresh-
old level), the monopolist will only produce (or purchase from its distributor) in
the first period and it will prefer to sell more in the first period than in the sec-
ond period (due to the discount factor). In line with the empirical evidence, the
price adjustment in the first period turns out to be more pronounced than with a
negative shock, while the opposite occurs in the second period.
3.7.2 Storage capacity
Throughout the analysis we assume that a firm’s storage capacity is exogenous and
equal to the market demand in each period. As argued in section 3.3, a capacity
level equal to the demand in each period is a reasonable assumption, since each
firm is able to undercut the rival and serve the whole market. Less interesting
is the case in which the capacity is below d. In such a scenario, each firm is
a monopolist on the residual demand, which creates the incentive to raise prices
above marginal costs even in the absence of a shock. Following Levitan and Shubik
(1972) and Osborne and Pitchik (1986), it can be shown that there exist mixed
strategy equilibria involving prices above marginal costs. A positive shock that
entails higher future costs still creates opportunities for profitable storing and, in
line with our results, prices will increase. In such a case, however, the analysis
would be less transparent.
If the firm’s capacity is larger than d, the analysis becomes more cumbersome.
In a two-period game, the firms may not be able to sell their initial orders. Our
conclusions remain valid but the incentive to immediately increase prices with a
positive shock is mitigated. Notably, an increase in the number of periods fully
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restores our results.
Related to this discussion is the question of the robustness of our results to an
increase in the number of periods. If the game is long enough so that firms are able
to sell all quantities at a certain future point in time, no price war occurs between
firms to empty their depositories and the price randomization in Lemma 7B no
longer emerges. In this case, if a positive shock occurs the price adjustment takes
place gradually, provided that the discounted profits are equal across periods.
3.7.3 Input costs
In our setting input costs move in a deterministic way. As argued in section 3.4,
nothing would change substantially if we assume that costs follow a stochastic
process, provided that future costs are expected to depart from the current ones.
One may wonder why in our model no trader can exploit arbitrage opportunities
arising from expected cost increases in the future. For instance, in the gasoline
market intermediaries could store some quantities and increase the current prices
charged to retailers. Notably, even in this case the mechanism described in our
analysis goes through but it applies to a different level of the supply chain.
3.7.4 Demand function
Consumer demand is supposed to be fully inelastic. This assumption is made
for the sake of tractability and turns out to be innocuous for our purposes. It
can certainly be the case that the demand function is not perfectly rigid but is
negatively sloped. This makes upward price deviations less attractive since the
demand is reduced, while downward deviations become more appealing. With a
negatively sloped demand function d(·), we have d(c1) > d(δc2) for δ > c1c2 . If the
storage capacity of each retailer is d(c1), it follows that when both firms purchase
d(c1) in the first period in order to sell it profitably in the two periods some
quantity will remain unsold. Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium and the firms
will have an incentive to undercut below δc2. It is well known in the literature
that in this setting a mixed strategy equilibrium exists. The incentive to increase
prices immediately with a positive shock should persist, even though it is softer.
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3.8 Concluding remarks
In this chapter we provide a theoretical explanation for the well-established phe-
nomenon of asymmetric price adjustments to input cost shocks. Using a model of
dynamic price competition, we show that the presence of profitable storing allows
competitive firms to credibly commit to immediately increase their prices above
current marginal costs when they anticipate higher input costs. As a result, com-
petition is mitigated and firms earn positive profits. If input costs are expected to
decline, the price adjustment is slower and prices reflect current marginal costs,
which entails zero profits. Our study suggests that empirical models should also
consider the impact of anticipated cost changes when estimating price patterns
over time. This can be done via an investigation of the firms’ price decisions
before a cost change materializes.
Even though our results are shown in a Bertrand-Edgeworth framework, prof-
itable storing remains the driving force for asymmetric pricing in alternative stan-
dard market structures such as monopoly or Cournot competition. Our findings
apply to the gasoline market as well as to other important sectors characterized
by storage opportunities. For instance, banks that issue deposits and employ the
funds to provide loans generally adjust the amount of liquidity they possess and
the rates on their loans in response to the announcement of a change in the central
bank’s interest rate.
Our analysis is potentially significant in different aspects. We develop a model
that focuses on the supply side and derives the pattern of asymmetric pricing as
a unique prediction of the game, abstracting from market imperfections such as
collusion among firms or limited information of consumers. Our results recommend
an empirical investigation that disentangles the well-known demand side effects
from the supply side effects identified in our analysis.
3.9 Appendix
This Appendix collects the proofs.
Proof of Lemma 7. In the quantity setting game, the analysis proceeds through
the following cases:
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(i) p2i = p2j > c2 ⇒ qm2i = d2 ,i = 1, 2.
(ii) p2i = p2j = c2 ⇒
∑2
i=1 q
m
2i 6 d.
(iii) p2i > p2j > c2 ⇒ qm2i = 0;qm2j = d.
(iv) p2i > p2j = c2 ⇒ qm2i = d− qm2j;qm2j ∈ [qr1j, d].
(v) p2i > c2 > p2j ⇒ qm2i = d− qm2j;qm2j = qr1j.
(vi) p2i = c2 > p2j ⇒ qm2i ∈ [min qr1i, d− qm2j, d− qm2j];qm2j = qr1j.
(vii) p2i = p2j < c2 ⇒ qm2i = min qr1i,max d2 , d− qm2j, i = 1, 2.
(viii) p2j < p2i < c2 ⇒ qm2i = min qr1i, d− qm2j;qm2j = qr1j.
A. Suppose
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i 6 d. The candidate equilibria in the price setting game
are (a) p2i = p2j= c2; (b) p2i = p2j > c2; (c) p2i > p2j > c2; (d) p2i > c2 > p2j; (e)
p2i < c2, i = 1, 2.
We first show that candidate (a) is an equilibrium. It follows from (ii) that the
equilibrium in the quantity setting game is qm2i ∈ [qr1i, d], which yields profits for
firm i equal to pi2i = c2q
r
1i.
17 Given (iv), when qm2j = d we can see that no profitable
upward price deviation exists. From (vi) it follows that there is no incentive to
deviate downward either. Therefore, the candidate (a) is an equilibrium, which
implies p∗2i = c2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
1i 6 d and qr∗2i = 0, i = 1, 2.
We now show that the price equilibrium (a) is unique. Candidate (b) is not an
equilibrium since if firm i sets a price p2j− > c2, where  > 0 and infinitely small,
it can get higher profits. Candidate (c) is not an equilibrium since firm j can set
p
′
2j ∈ (p2j, p2i) and get higher profits. Candidate (d) is not an equilibrium since
firm j can set a price p
′
2j ∈ (p2j, c2) and gain by selling its reserves. If it does not
have any reserve, firm i can gain by setting a higher price. Candidate (e) is not an
equilibrium since both firms have an incentive to raise their prices. Therefore, the
outcome (p∗2i, q
m∗
2i , q
r∗
2i ) is an equilibrium in the second period continuation game if
and only if p∗2i = c2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
1i 6 d and qr∗2i = 0,i = 1, 2.
B. Suppose
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i > d. Since the second period is the final period of the
game, each firm wants to exhaust its reserves. In equilibrium the market clears (the
two firms in aggregate fully cover the market) and a firm’s reserve is the residual
17Indeed, there are other equilibria in the quantity setting game when firm i carries less than
d
2 from the first period and firm j carries more than
d
2 . In these equilibria, firm i buys some
quantity at c2 and serves up to half the market, while firm j cannot sell all its reserves. However,
this cannot support a SPNE in the second period continuation game, since firm i has an incentive
to undercut in order to sell all its reserves.
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from the first period that the firm is unable to sell in the second period, namely,∑2
i=1 q
m∗
2i = d and q
r∗
2i = max 0, q
r∗
1i − qm∗2i , i = 1, 2. Since the firms do not order
any additional quantities, this game corresponds to a price competition game with
(a)symmetric capacity constraints. We know from Levitan and Shubik (1972) and
Osborne and Pitchik (1986) that there exists an equilibrium (which is generally
unique), where firms randomize in prices within the support [p∗
2
, p∗2] ⊆ [0, c2]. Any
price above c2 cannot be chosen with positive probability, since price undercutting
is always profitable. Moreover, choosing with probability 1 a price equal to c2
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium since each firm has an incentive to undercut
the rival and sell off all its reserves.
Proof of Remark 2. We know from Lemma 7 that p∗2i 6 c. For δ < 1 no firm
has an incentive to store some quantity for the next period, i.e., qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
Therefore, as in Chowdhury (2005), we have p∗τi = c and
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d, τ, i = 1, 2,
in equilibrium. For δ = 1, storing is not harmful if
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i 6 d. Therefore, any
outcome
∑2
i=1 q
r
1i 6 d such that p∗τi = c and
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d, τ, i = 1, 2, can be
sustained in equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. A. For δ > c1
c2
each firm finds it profitable to order
one unit today at c1 and sell it tomorrow if the price in the second period is c2.
First, we argue that no equilibrium exists which involves a price c1 < p1i < δc2,
i = 1, 2. Assume that there exists an equilibrium in the quantity setting game
which supports these prices as an equilibrium strategy. Such an equilibrium must
imply that each firm will order d in the first period, i.e., q1i = d, i = 1, 2, since
for any given quantity of the rival a firm can sell profitably in either period. Note
that the outcome qm1i = 0, q
m
2i = d with q
m
1j = d, q
m
2j = 0 (and the reverse) cannot
be supported as an equilibrium in quantities for c1 6 p1i < δc2, i = 1, 2. The
rationale is the following. Suppose that firm j deviates in the first period and
stores a quantity q˜1j > 0 for the next period. It follows from the proof of Lemma
7B that a (unique) mixed strategy equilibrium in the second period continuation
game exists. Firm j can always choose a sufficiently small quantity q˜1j > 0 such
that the lower bound of the price interval is higher than p1j/δ. This implies that
firm j which stores q˜1j for the next period gains from such a deviation. This result
is crucial in order to show that there exists an incentive for upward deviation in
prices in the first period. Let Li ≡ pii : pii = (p1i − c1)qm1i + (δp2i − c1)qm2i be the
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set of firm i’s profits associated with the candidate c1 6 p1i < δc2, i = 1, 2, if
an equilibrium in quantities exists. From the previous discussion and the result
in Lemma 7B it follows that sup(Li) < (δc2 − c1) d. Now, we characterize the
equilibrium in the quantity setting game in the first period following a deviation
such that p
′
1i > δc2 > p1j. Let Si ≡
{
pi
′
i : pi
′
i =
(
p
′
1i − c1
)
qm
′
1i +
(
δp
′
2i − c1
)
qm
′
2i
}
be the set of firm i’s profits associated with p
′
1i > δc2 > p1j. Since firm i has a
strict preference for selling today while firm j has a strict preference for selling
tomorrow, firm i never wants to engage in a price war in the second period, which
implies that d will be sold in both periods and p
′
2i = c2. Moreover, following the
previous argument, firm j will always prefer to bring a positive quantity to the
second period, which implies that firm i can sell something in the first period.
Therefore, inf(Si) > (δc2 − c1) d > sup(Li). Since an equilibrium in quantities
with p
′
1i > δc2 > p1j exists (e.g., q
m
1i = d, q
m
2i = 0 and q
m
1j = 0, q
m
2j = d), it follows
that firm i has an incentive to deviate and c1 6 p1i < δc2, i = 1, 2, cannot be an
equilibrium.
It can immediately be shown that p1i > δc2 > p1j cannot be an equilibrium,
since firm j can always set a price p
′
1j = p1i −  > δc2, where  > 0 and infinitely
small, and gain. Moreover, p1i = δc2 > p1j cannot be an equilibrium, either. Firm j
does not have any incentive to deviate only when qm1j = 0 and q
m
2j = d in equilibrium.
However, in this case firm i gets profits (δc2− c1)d and we know from the previous
discussion that it can set p
′
1i > δc2 > p1j and gain. It is also straightforward to
argue that an equilibrium which involves p1i > δc2, i = 1, 2, where at least one
firm sets p1i > δc2 cannot be sustained as the standard undercutting reasoning
applies.
The only price candidate that we have not investigated yet is p1i = δc2, i = 1, 2.
Note that, irrespective of the direction of price deviation by firm i, there exists
an equilibrium in the quantity setting game where qm1i = 0, q
m
2i = d and q
m
1j = d,
qm2j = 0. In this case, no deviation is profitable. A similar argument applies
for any price deviation by firm j. Then, an outcome is a SPNE if and only if
p∗1i = δp
∗
2i = δc2,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi = d, q
r∗
1i = d− qm∗1i and qr∗2i = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
B. For δ < c1
c2
, storing is never profitable, i.e., qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2. Therefore,
the standard Bertrand rationale applies and an outcome is a SPNE if and only if
p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Since storing is not profitable, the same argument as
in the proof of Proposition 5B applies.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let δ > c1
c2
. We first derive the equilibrium in the
first period quantity setting game when prices are p1i = δp2i = δc2, i = 1, 2. Note
that in equilibrium both firms will order
∑2
i=1 q1i > d, since the marginal (and
average) cost in (3.4) is c˜1 = c1 for
∑2
i=1 q1i 6 d. The quantity ordered by firm i
in the first period can be written as q1i = q˜
e
1i + q
e
1i, where q˜
e
1i denotes the quantity
ordered by firm i such that together with the corresponding quantity ordered by
firm j it holds
∑2
i=1 q˜
e
1i = d. For a given q˜
e
1i, i = 1, 2, firm i chooses q
e
1i and faces
an average cost equal to c˜1 =
c1d+c2
∑2
i=1 q
e
1i
d+
∑2
i=1 q
e
1i
. Firm i’s maximization problem is
max
qe1i≥0
δc2(q˜
e
1i + q
e
1i)− c˜1(q˜e1i + qe1i),
which yields the following first-order condition for an interior solution
δc2
(
d+
∑2
i=1 q
e
1i
)2 − c1d (d+ qe1j − q˜e1i)− c2 [(∑2i=1 qe1i)2 + d (2qe1i + qe1j + q˜e1i)](
d+
∑2
i=1 q
e
1i
)2 = 0.
Combining terms implies
qe1i
(
qe1j
)
= − (d+ qe1j)+ (c2 − c1) 12 [c2d (d+ qe1j − q˜e1i) (1− δ)]
1
2
c2 (1− δ) . (A.1)
Equation (A.1) gives the best response function for firm i. In the same vein, we
obtain the best response function for firm j
qe1j (q
e
1i) = − (d+ qe1i) +
(c2 − c1)
1
2
[
c2d
(
d+ qe1i − q˜e1j
)
(1− δ)] 12
c2 (1− δ) . (A.2)
Solving (A.1) and (A.2) simultaneously implies that in the unique symmetric equi-
librium the quantity ordered by firm i in the first period is
q∗1i = q˜
e∗
1i + q
e∗
1i =
(c2 − c1)d
4c2(1− δ) , i = 1, 2. (A.3)
Since
∑2
i=1 q˜
e
1i = d, (A.3) is a solution for firm i’s maximization problem if
(c2−c1)d
4c2(1−δ)−
d
2
> 0, which implies δ > 1
2
(1 + c1
c2
). Firm i’s profits are given by pi∗i = (δc2 −
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c1d+c2
∑2
i=1 q
e∗
1i
d+
∑2
i=1 q
e∗
1i
)q∗1i =
(c2−c1)d
4
> 0. In the sequel, we split the analysis according the
value of the discount factor δ.
A. Assume δ > 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
). For δ = 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
) we obtain from (A.3) q∗1i = d,
i = 1, 2. Since
∂q∗1i
∂δ
> 0, it follows that q∗1i = d, i = 1, 2, still holds for higher values
of δ. In words, in the first period each firm orders its full capacity. Therefore,
the analysis of Proposition 5 carries over and p∗1i = δp
∗
2i = δc2 are the equilibrium
prices.
B. Assume c1
c2
6 δ < 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
). We first demonstrate that the candidate
p1i = δp2i = δc2, i = 1, 2, cannot be an equilibrium since a firm has an incentive
to (infinitely) increase its price in the first period. Such a deviation would not be
profitable if and only if the rival orders and sells d in the first period. We show
that this cannot be an equilibrium in the quantity setting game (if it exists at
all). Note that, since firm i’s (marginal) revenue following the deviation is higher
(or at least not lower), firm i does not want to buy less than in the candidate
equilibrium and, in response, the non-deviating firm j does not want to buy more.
For δ > 1
2
(1+ c1
c2
), the equilibrium in the quantity setting game with p∗1i = δp
∗
2i = δc2
is still described by (A.3). Therefore, following an upward price deviation of firm
i, the non-deviating firm j will not buy more than (c2−c1)d
4c2(1−δ) < d. For δ <
1
2
(1 + c1
c2
),
the solution in (A.3) is no longer valid. This implies that firm i’s maximization
problem yields qe1i = 0. In words, for prices p1i = δp2i = δc2, i = 1, 2, the firms
do not want to order in aggregate more than d. For our purposes, it is sufficient
to show that an equilibrium in the quantity setting game with p1i = δp2i = δc2,
i = 1, 2, cannot involve q1i = 0 and q1j = d. This is because, given that firm j buys
d in the first period, firm i’s marginal revenue is higher than the marginal cost at
zero, i.e., δc2 > c1, and therefore firm i has an incentive to order some quantity in
the first period (and sell it in either period). This implies that the non-deviating
firm j will buy less than d. As a consequence, for c1
c2
6 δ < 1
4
(3 + c1
c2
), firm i can
set an infinitely high price to cover the residual demand in the first period and be
better off.
As long as the first period prices are higher than δc2, each firm has an incentive
to undercut to sell in the first period. Moreover, any price below δc2 cannot be
supported as an equilibrium, since the non-deviating firm will always prefer to sell
at least some positive quantity in the next period while the rival could increase the
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price and sell profitably in the first period. Along the same lines, it can be shown
that an asymmetric price configuration (one firm sets the price above δc2 and the
rival below δc2) also cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, for
c1
c2
6 δ < 1
4
(3+ c1
c2
), there
is no equilibrium in the price setting game and no SPNE exists in pure strategies.
Since the rigid demand allows a deviating firm to set an infinite price, no SPNE
exists even in mixed strategies.
C. Assume δ < c1
c2
. The proof of Proposition 5B is replicated.
Proof of Proposition 8. First note that qr1i > 0 is never optimal since c˜1 > c2 >
p2i (from Lemma 7). It is straightforward to show that any price configuration
where p1i > p1j > c1, p1i > c1 > p1j or p1i = p1j > c1 cannot be sustained as an
equilibrium since the standard undercutting rationale applies.
To proceed, it is useful to determine the outcome in the first period quantity
setting game for some relevant cases:
(i) p1i > p1j = c1 ⇒ qm1i = 0; qm1j = d. Any qm1i > 0 cannot be an equilibrium,
since firm j’s best response would be qm1j = d (which guarantees positive profits
since c1 > c˜1), and firm i would make losses.
(ii) p1i > c1 > p1j > c1+c22 . There does not exist any pure strategy Nash
equilibrium. The reason is that there is a critical threshold q˜1i ∈ (0, d] at which
pij = (p1j − c˜1)d = 0 and pij > 0 if and only if q1i > q˜1i. Hence, the best response
function of firm j is discontinuous and jumps from q1j(q1i) = 0 for q1i < q˜1i
to q1j(q1i) = d for q1i > q˜1i. For our aims, it is sufficient to show that in any
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium we must have that (a) the (expected) profit of
firm i is strictly positive for p1i > c1, and (b) the (expected) profit of firm j is
zero. Afterwards, we demonstrate that such an equilibrium exists. The result (a)
follows since there exists a quantity q1i < q˜1i such that pii = (p1i − c˜1)q1i > 0
for p1i > c1 > c˜1 and pij = (p1j − c˜1)d < 0. To see the result (b), recall that
any strategy q1j ∈ (0, d) is strictly dominated by the two extreme values 0 and
d. The only strategy profile which is part of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
is the set 0, d. Since any pure strategy which is part of a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium must yield the same (expected) payoff and q1j = 0 gives zero payoff,
then q1j = d must also give zero, which implies that the profit of firm j is zero.
A mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this subgame prescribes that firm i chooses
with probability 1 the quantity q˜1i and firm j randomizes between zero and d such
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that its expected quantity equals d− q˜1i.
(iii) p1i = c1 > p1j > c1+c22 . The equilibrium described in (ii) still holds true,
yet in addition we have an equilibrium in pure strategies where q1i = 0, i = 1, 2.
(iv) p1i < c1 ⇒ qm1i = 0, i = 1, 2. Each firm has a dominant strategy not to
serve the market.
Combining (ii) and (iv) it is easy to argue that any c1 > p1i > p1j or p1i = c1 >
p1j cannot be an equilibrium since firm i has an incentive to increase the price
above c1 and gain.
It remains to be shown that p1i = c1, i = 1, 2, is chosen in equilibrium. From
(iii) it follows that firm i does not have an incentive to deviate downwards. Sim-
ilarly, if firm i deviates upwards, we are in the quantity equilibrium described in
(i) so that firm i does not gain from deviation. Hence, any outcome (p∗τi, q
m∗
τi , q
r∗
τi ),
where p∗τi = cτ ,
∑2
i=1 q
m∗
τi 6 d and qr∗τi = 0, τ, i = 1, 2, sustains a SPNE.
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